Etat : Very Good. Very Good condition. A copy that may have a few cosmetic defects. May also contain light spine creasing or a few markings such as an owner's name, short gifter's inscription or light stamp. N� de r�f. du vendeur M10D-01265

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Strategic Command and Control

Blair, Bruce

Edit� par Globe Pequot Publishing Group Inc/Bloomsbury, 1985

ISBN 10 : 0815709811 ISBN 13 : 9780815709817

Ancien ou d'occasion Paperback

Vendeur : ThriftBooks-Atlanta, AUSTELL, GA, Etats-Unis

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Paperback. Etat : Good. No Jacket. Pages can have notes/highlighting. Spine may show signs of wear. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 1.14. N� de r�f. du vendeur G0815709811I3N00

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Strategic Command and Control

Bruce Blair

Edit� par Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1985

ISBN 10 : 0815709811 ISBN 13 : 9780815709817

Neuf PAP

Vendeur : PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Royaume-Uni

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PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. N� de r�f. du vendeur CW-9780815709817

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Strategic Command and Control (Paperback or Softback)

Blair, Bruce

Edit� par Brookings Institution Press 5/1/1985, 1985

ISBN 10 : 0815709811 ISBN 13 : 9780815709817

Neuf Paperback or Softback

Vendeur : BargainBookStores, Grand Rapids, MI, Etats-Unis

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Paperback or Softback. Etat : New. Strategic Command and Control 1.1. Book. N� de r�f. du vendeur BBS-9780815709817

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Strategic Command and Control; Redefining the Nuclear Threat

Blair, Bruce G.

Edit� par The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1985

ISBN 10 : 0815709811 ISBN 13 : 9780815709817

Ancien ou d'occasion Trade paperback Edition originale

Vendeur : Ground Zero Books, Ltd., Silver Spring, MD, Etats-Unis

�valuation du vendeur 5 sur 5 �toiles

Trade paperback. Etat : Very good. xiv, 341, [13] pages. Illustrations, black & white. Abbreviations and Acronyms. Map. Footnotes. Index. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Bruce G. Blair (born 1947) is a nuclear security expert and a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He focuses on technical and policy steps on the path toward the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, specifically on deep bilateral nuclear arms reductions, multilateral arms negotiations and de-alerting of nuclear arsenals. In 2011, he was appointed to the U.S. Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board, a small group of experts that provides the Department of State with independent insight and advice on all aspects of international security, disarmament and arms control. In 1999, he was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship Prize for his research, work and leadership on de-alerting nuclear forces. There are several definitions of command and control (C2). According to older versions of U.S. Army FM 3-0, C2 in a military organization is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commanding officer over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. The term may also refer to command and control systems within a military system. Strategic Command and Control applies to nuclear weapons. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decision makers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence. First edition. First paperback edition. First printing [stated]. N� de r�f. du vendeur 71926

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Strategic Command and Control (Paperback)

Bruce Blair

Edit� par Rowman & Littlefield, Washington DC, 1985

ISBN 10 : 0815709811 ISBN 13 : 9780815709817

Neuf Paperback

Vendeur : Grand Eagle Retail, Fairfield, OH, Etats-Unis

�valuation du vendeur 5 sur 5 �toiles

Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decisionmakers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N� de r�f. du vendeur 9780815709817

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Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat

Bruce G. Blair

Edit� par Brookings Institution Press, 1985

ISBN 10 : 0815709811 ISBN 13 : 9780815709817

Ancien ou d'occasion Soft cover Edition originale

Vendeur : Palimpsest Scholarly Books & Services, Brooktondale, NY, Etats-Unis

�valuation du vendeur 5 sur 5 �toiles

Soft cover. Etat : Fine. 1st Edition. Second printing. Softcover volume, measuring approximately 6.25" x 9.25", displays very light shelfwear. Binding is firm. Interior is clean and bright. Illustrated with tables, graphs and maps. xiv/341 pages. "During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U. S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communication not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike.". N� de r�f. du vendeur ABE-1612589900598

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