While much foreign aid achieves commendable goals, some is ineffective. In this volume, Clifford Zinnes argues that a donor's intrinsic informational limitations on the local context as well as inability to control the progress of interventions mean that lack of success is not rooting in insufficient funding but in maladapted institution designs of interventions that don't foster local ownership. He indentifies and assesses a newly emerging class of foreign aid delivery that promises to overcome these obstacles. The approach is based on prospective inter-jurisdictional competition (PIJC). Beneficiary groups—often local-level governments, supported by their private sector and civil society—act as teams and compete against each other under explicit predefined rules and objectives to design and implement interventions under their own aegis to achieve the highest quantitatively measured performance, either relative to others (tournaments) or against a preset benchmark (certification). Teams that cooperate internally are the likeliest to win the rewards, which, aside from the longer run benefits of the intervention itself, might include more substantive financial or technical assitance from the sponsor.
Since only groups serious about reforming choose to play, Zinnes says the incentives generated by the ensuing race-to-the-top competitiion create local ownership, encouraging recipients to draw on their own knowledge. Moreover, since all teams that compete—and not just those who win donor rewards—benefit from their own reform efforts, he argues that this approach can leverage aid resources more than a conventional bilateral aid agreement. Zinnes presents a dozen recent applications of the approach, including those sponsored by the World Bank, USAID, the United Nations, the Ford Foundation, and others. He also recommends improvements and ways to scale up PIJC-based projects in applications ranging from protecting the environment and reducing red tape through to raising literacy and co-opting warlords.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Clifford F. Zinnes is a senior fellow at the IRIS Center in the Economics Department and a faculty affliliate at the Maryland School of Public Policy, both at the University of Maryland. Focusing on aid effectiveness, as a practitioner of the ""new"" institutional economics, Zinnes also writes on the shadow economy, environmental protection, and failing and fragile states. While at Harvard University for more than a decade, he taught and conducted field work in a dozen countries, including Romania, where he coauthored several laws related to privatization, water management, and environmental protection.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : Wonder Book, Frederick, MD, Etats-Unis
Etat : Very Good. Very Good condition. A copy that may have a few cosmetic defects. May also contain light spine creasing or a few markings such as an owner's name, short gifter's inscription or light stamp. N° de réf. du vendeur G11A-02611
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Midtown Scholar Bookstore, Harrisburg, PA, Etats-Unis
paperback. Etat : Very Good. Very Good paperback with light shelfwear - NICE! Standard-sized. N° de réf. du vendeur mon0000248001
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : MB Books, Derbyshire, Royaume-Uni
Soft cover. Etat : Good. No Jacket. Condition : Good. Soft cover, no jacket. Former university library copy with associated markings. 369pp. No highlighting or annotations to text. Covered in protective laminate. Photo on request. N° de réf. du vendeur 943280
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : K Books Ltd ABA ILAB, York, YORKS, Royaume-Uni
Soft cover. Etat : As New. 1st Edition. WITH 369 PAGES , SOFT COVER , VERY GOOD CONDITION, EXCELLENT VALUE. N° de réf. du vendeur MISC/167
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : California Books, Miami, FL, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur I-9780815797197
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Etats-Unis
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur L0-9780815797197
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Royaume-Uni
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur L0-9780815797197
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Libro Co. Italia Srl, San Casciano Val di Pesa, FI, Italie
Brossura. Etat : fine. 2009; br., pp. 369, cm 15,5x23. Libro. N° de réf. du vendeur 3391433
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, Etats-Unis
Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. While much foreign aid achieves commendable goals, some is ineffective. In this volume, Clifford Zinnes argues that a donor's intrinsic informational limitations on the local context as well as inability to control the progress of interventions mean that lack of success is not rooting in insufficient funding but in maladapted institution designs of interventions that don't foster local ownership. He indentifies and assesses a newly emerging class of foreign aid delivery that promises to overcome these obstacles. The approach is based on ""prospective inter-jurisdictional competition"" (PIJC). Beneficiary groupsoften local-level governments, supported by their private sector and civil societyact as teams and compete against each other under explicit predefined rules and objectives to design and implement interventions under their own aegis to achieve the highest quantitatively measured performance, either relative to others (""tournaments"") or against a preset benchmark (""certification""). Teams that cooperate internally are the likeliest to win the rewards, which, aside from the longer run benefits of the intervention itself, might include more substantive financial or technical assitance from the sponsor.Since only groups serious about reforming choose to play, Zinnes says the incentives generated by the ensuing ""race-to-the-top"" competitiion create local ownership, encouraging recipients to draw on their own knowledge. Moreover, since all teams that competeand not just those who ""win"" donor rewardsbenefit from their own reform efforts, he argues that this approach can leverage aid resources more than a conventional bilateral aid agreement. Zinnes presents a dozen recent applications of the approach, including those sponsored by the World Bank, USAID, the United Nations, the Ford Foundation, and others. He also recommends improvements and ways to scale up PIJC-based projects in applications ranging from protecting the environment and reducing red tape through to raising literacy and co-opting warlords. While much foreign aid achieves commendable goals, some is ineffective. In this volume, Clifford Zinnes argues that a donor's intrinsic informational limitations on the local context as well as inability to control the progress of interventions mean that lack of success is not rooting in insufficient funding but in maladapted institution designs of interventions that don't foster local ownership. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780815797197
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. In. N° de réf. du vendeur ria9780815797197_new
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles