Much contemporary scholarship on free will focuses on whether it is compatible with causal determinism. According to compatibilists, it is possible for an agent to be determined in all her choices and actions and still be free. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, think that the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. There are two dominant general conceptions of the nature of free will. According to the first of these, free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does. On this view, free will centrally depends upon alternative possibilities. The second approach focuses instead on issues of sourcehood, holding that free will is primarily a function of an agent being the source of her actions in a particular way. This book demarcates these two different conceptions free will, explores the relationship between them, and examines how they relate to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. It ultimately argues for a version of Source Incompatibilism.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Kevin Timpe is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Northwest Nazarene University, USA, and Templeton Research Fellow at St. Peter's College, University of Oxford, UK. He is the author of Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives (Continuum, 2008) and editor of Metaphysics and God (Routledge, 2009) and Arguing about Religion (Routledge, 2009). His recent publications have appeared in Philosophical Studies, American Philosophical Quarterly, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Faith and Philosophy, Religious Studies, and Philosophia. He is Philosophy of Religion Area Editor for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
EUR 3,41 expédition vers Etats-Unis
Destinations, frais et délaisGratuit expédition vers Etats-Unis
Destinations, frais et délaisVendeur : harvardyard, Northfield, MN, Etats-Unis
Hardcover. Etat : Good. 2nd edition. pages are tight and unmarked, dent on spine. N° de réf. du vendeur 1-21-16-9483k-NA
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Powell's Bookstores Chicago, ABAA, Chicago, IL, Etats-Unis
Etat : Used - Very Good. 2008. Hardcover. Library binding. Some shelf-wear. Else clean copy. Very Good. N° de réf. du vendeur SON000009915
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Etats-Unis
HRD. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur L1-9780826496256
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. In English. N° de réf. du vendeur ria9780826496256_new
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Royaume-Uni
HRD. Etat : New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur L1-9780826496256
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur ABLIING23Mar2317530002264
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : moluna, Greven, Allemagne
Gebunden. Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Covers an argument in contemporary debates about free will and moral responsibility.InhaltsverzeichnisPart I: Basic Issues and Positions 1. Introduction 2. The Compatibility Question 3. Revisionist Views* 4. Skeptical Views* Par. N° de réf. du vendeur 595082549
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne
Buch. Etat : Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Much contemporary scholarship on free will focuses on whether it is compatible with causal determinism. According to compatibilists, it is possible for an agent to be determined in all her choices and actions and still be free. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, think that the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. There are two dominant general conceptions of the nature of free will. According to the first of these, free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does. On this view, free will centrally depends upon alternative possibilities. The second approach focuses instead on issues of sourcehood, holding that free will is primarily a function of an agent being the source of her actions in a particular way. This book demarcates these two different conceptions free will, explores the relationship between them, and examines how they relate to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. It ultimately argues for a version of Source Incompatibilism. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780826496256
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Revaluation Books, Exeter, Royaume-Uni
Hardcover. Etat : Brand New. 1st edition. 208 pages. 9.25x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock. N° de réf. du vendeur x-0826496253
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : BWS BKS, Ferndale, NY, Etats-Unis
Hardcover. Etat : New. *** FREE UPGRADE to Courier/Priority Shipping Upon Request *** - *** IN STOCK AND IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR SHIPMENT - Flawless copy, brand new, pristine, never opened -- 224 pages. Description: "This is an important and engaging book on a key argument in contemporary debates about free will and moral responsibility. Much contemporary scholarship on free will focuses on whether it is compatible with causal determinism. According to compatibilists, it is possible for an agent to be determined in all her choices and actions and still be free. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, think that the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. There are two dominant general conceptions of the nature of free will. According to the first of these, free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does. On this view, free will centrally depends upon alternative possibilities. The second approach focuses instead on issues of sourcehood, holding that free will is primarily a function of an agent being the source of her actions in a particular way. This book demarcates these two different conceptions free will, explores the relationship between them, and examines how they relate to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. It ultimately argues for a version of Source Incompatibilism". It ultimately argues for a version of Source Incompatibilism". -- with a bonus offer--. N° de réf. du vendeur 91711
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)