The Secrets of 9/11: Why the CIA and FBI Allowed the Attacks on 9/11 - Couverture souple

Schopmeyer, Robert

 
9780979106026: The Secrets of 9/11: Why the CIA and FBI Allowed the Attacks on 9/11

Synopsis

After reading material the al-Qaeda terrorists had written and published on February 23, 1998, the author of this book determined that the targets in the US that al Qaeda terrorists would attack had to be buildings holding large numbers of civilians, iconic buildings that were highly visible to deliver a slap in the face of every American. It was bin Laden himself who would pick the targets. Hence, these targets had to be what could be called targets that were "too obvious" since bin Laden would only pick iconic buildings known worldwide. Unable to identify any obvious target, the author threw the magazine down in disgust and picked up the travel brochure from the seat pocket in front of his seat. The cover was a photo of Manhattan from a position well above the Statue of Liberty, and the WTC towers were right in the middle of this photo.

It was instantly obvious. The targets had to be the World Trade Center Towers. Since the 1993 attack used a truck bomb, security was still looking for a truck bomb. The only obvious way the terrorists could attack these towers was with hijacked aircraft. Because these towers were so large, it looked like the terrorists would be forced to hijack four large US airliners in flight to carry out this attack and fly these aircraft directly into the sides of these towers, causing them to collapse.

They would hijack planes departing from eastern airports, Logan, Newark, and Dulles, using four to five terrorists per plane armed with four-inch knives. This attack would take place during the first two weeks of September 2001.

On September 8, 2001, the author flew out to Boston and went through Logan Airport looking for the terrorists who were going to carry out this impending attack. This information has been given to the FBI "under oath" multiple times, the Joint Inquiry Committee of the House and Senate, and the 9/11 Commission.

Almost 3000 people in the US were murdered when the CIA and FBI HQ ITOS agents withheld the information from the FBI Cole bombing investigators until 2 days after the attacks on 9/11, the information that came out of the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting. This information was that Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at that meeting planning the Cole bombing with Walid Bin Attash. The CIA and FBI HQ knew on August 22, 2001, that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside the US to participate in a massive al Qaeda terrorist attack.

Why this information was deliberately hidden from the FBI Cole bombing investigators has never been explained, the very information the FBI Cole bombing investigators needed to be able to start any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi and prevent the attacks on 9/11. When the CIA and FBI HQ deliberately kept the Kuala Lumpur information secret, they were both aware that this would block this one investigation that could have prevented this al Qaeda attack.

After 23 years, the reasons the CIA and the FBI HQ ITOS agents had withheld the Kuala Lumpur information have never been uncovered, even after several federal investigations of the 9/11 attacks, investigations that were obfuscated to hide government malfeasance. The reasons why the CIA and the FBIHQ ITOS unit withheld the Kuala Lumpur information from the FBI Cole bombing investigators detailed in this book are based on years of work going over several thousand pages of official US government documents. This author also interviewed FBI agents who wanted to find Mihdhar and Hazmi before they had time to take part in an attack inside the US and agents who had wanted to get a FISA warrant to search Moussaoui's possessions. Had either investigation been given this information, the information they already had for over three weeks prior to the attacks on 9/11 would have prevented the attacks on 9/11.

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