This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.
The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.
This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Dong Sun Lee is a Professor of International Relations at Korea University, Seoul, South Korea. He has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago and is the author of Power Shifts, Strategy, and War: Declining States and International Conflict (2008).
Iordanka Alexandrova is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University of Science and Technology, South Korea. She has a PhD in Political Science from Korea University.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781032914091
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Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781032914091
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