This text interrogates the role of experts in governing and proposes a viable alternative: governing by democratic discussion.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
David M. Levy is Professor of Economics at George Mason University, Washington DC. He has worked with Sandra J. Peart at the University of Richmond for fifteen years, and both have co-directed the Summer Institute for the History of Economics and have been honored by the History of Economics Society.
Sandra J. Peart is Dean and Professor in the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at the University of Richmond. She is a former president of the History of Economics Society and the president of the International Adam Smith Society.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. In English. N° de réf. du vendeur ria9781107142398_new
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : California Books, Miami, FL, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur I-9781107142398
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Royaume-Uni
Hardback. Etat : New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days. N° de réf. du vendeur C9781107142398
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : CitiRetail, Stevenage, Royaume-Uni
Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. The orthodox view of economic policy holds that public deliberation sets the goals or ends, and then experts select the means to implement these goals. This assumes that experts are no more than trustworthy servants of the public interest. David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart examine the historical record to consider cases in which experts were trusted with disastrous results, such as eugenics, the regulatory use of security ratings, and central economic planning. This history suggests that experts have not only the public interest but also their own interests to consider. The authors then recover and extend an alternative view of economic policy that subjects experts' proposals to further discussion, resulting in transparency and ensuring that the public obtains the best insights of experts in economics while avoiding pitfalls such as expert bias. David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart show how setting economic policy goals and putting experts in charge of implementing them fails dramatically. They argue that determining the ends and the means can be accomplished more successfully through an ongoing democratic discussion. This provides transparency and protects against expert bias. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781107142398
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Books Puddle, Woodside, NY, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 26389698043
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Majestic Books, Hounslow, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. Print on Demand. N° de réf. du vendeur 390983204
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Allemagne
Etat : New. PRINT ON DEMAND. N° de réf. du vendeur 18389698033
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : moluna, Greven, Allemagne
Gebunden. Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart show how setting economic policy goals and putting experts in charge of implementing them fails dramatically. They argue that determining the ends and the means can be accomplished more successfully through an ongoing democ. N° de réf. du vendeur 447216438
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Revaluation Books, Exeter, Royaume-Uni
Hardcover. Etat : Brand New. 1st edition. 288 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.50 inches. In Stock. N° de réf. du vendeur x-1107142393
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne
Buch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The orthodox view of economic policy holds that public deliberation sets the goals or ends, and then experts select the means to implement these goals. This assumes that experts are no more than trustworthy servants of the public interest. David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart examine the historical record to consider cases in which experts were trusted with disastrous results, such as eugenics, the regulatory use of security ratings, and central economic planning. This history suggests that experts have not only the public interest but also their own interests to consider. The authors then recover and extend an alternative view of economic policy that subjects experts' proposals to further discussion, resulting in transparency and ensuring that the public obtains the best insights of experts in economics while avoiding pitfalls such as expert bias. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781107142398
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)