Modern investment treaties give private arbitrators power to determine whether governments should pay compensation to foreign investors for a wide range of sovereign acts. In recent years, particularly developing countries have incurred significant liabilities from investment treaty arbitration, which begs the question why they signed the treaties in the first place. Through a comprehensive and timely analysis, this book shows that governments in developing countries typically overestimated the economic benefits of investment treaties and practically ignored their risks. Rooted in insights on bounded rationality from behavioural psychology and economics, the analysis highlights how policy-makers often relied on inferential shortcuts when assessing the implications of the treaties, which resulted in systematic deviations from fully rational behaviour. This not only sheds new light on one of the most controversial legal regimes underwriting economic globalization but also provides a novel theoretical account of the often irrational, yet predictable, nature of economic diplomacy.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen is a Lecturer in International Political Economy at University College London.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : Wonder Book, Frederick, MD, Etats-Unis
Etat : As New. Like New condition. A near perfect copy that may have very minor cosmetic defects. N° de réf. du vendeur D04N-01022
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : New. Modern investment treaties give private arbitrators power to determine whether governments should pay compensation to foreign investors for a wide range of sovereign acts. In recent years, particularly developing countries have incurred significant liabilities from investment treaty arbitration, which begs the question why they signed the treaties in the first place. Through a comprehensive and timely analysis, this book shows that governments in developing countries typically overestimated the economic benefits of investment treaties and practically ignored their risks. Rooted in insights on bounded rationality from behavioural psychology and economics, the analysis highlights how policy-makers often relied on inferential shortcuts when assessing the implications of the treaties, which resulted in systematic deviations from fully rational behaviour. This not only sheds new light on one of the most controversial legal regimes underwriting economic globalization but also provides a novel theoretical account of the often irrational, yet predictable, nature of economic diplomacy. N° de réf. du vendeur LU-9781107552012
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, Etats-Unis
Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. Modern investment treaties give private arbitrators power to determine whether governments should pay compensation to foreign investors for a wide range of sovereign acts. In recent years, particularly developing countries have incurred significant liabilities from investment treaty arbitration, which begs the question why they signed the treaties in the first place. Through a comprehensive and timely analysis, this book shows that governments in developing countries typically overestimated the economic benefits of investment treaties and practically ignored their risks. Rooted in insights on bounded rationality from behavioural psychology and economics, the analysis highlights how policy-makers often relied on inferential shortcuts when assessing the implications of the treaties, which resulted in systematic deviations from fully rational behaviour. This not only sheds new light on one of the most controversial legal regimes underwriting economic globalization but also provides a novel theoretical account of the often irrational, yet predictable, nature of economic diplomacy. Investment treaties have empowered foreign investors to file expensive, controversial, and wide-ranging claims against sovereign states. This book examines why and how the treaties were negotiated based on a novel theory of economic diplomacy rooted in behavioural economics and psychology. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781107552012
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : California Books, Miami, FL, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur I-9781107552012
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. In. N° de réf. du vendeur ria9781107552012_new
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Revaluation Books, Exeter, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : Brand New. reprint edition. 263 pages. 8.98x5.98x0.71 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand. N° de réf. du vendeur __110755201X
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Chiron Media, Wallingford, Royaume-Uni
PF. Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 6666-IUK-9781107552012
Quantité disponible : 10 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Irlande
Etat : New. This book examines how developing countries often sign up to highly potent rules underwriting economic globalisation without even realising it. Num Pages: 263 pages, 15 b/w illus. 15 tables. BIC Classification: JFFS; JPS; KCL; KCLT; KCP; LBBM. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 229 x 152. . . 2017. Paperback. . . . . N° de réf. du vendeur V9781107552012
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Royaume-Uni
Paperback / softback. Etat : New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days. N° de réf. du vendeur C9781107552012
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Books Puddle, New York, NY, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 26376285793
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)