Incentives to Pander: How Politicians Use Corporate Welfare for Political Gain - Couverture souple

Jensen, Nathan

Couverture souple

ISBN 10 : 1108408532 ISBN 13 : 9781108408530

Editeur : Cambridge University Press, 2019

Synopsis

Policies targeting individual companies for economic development incentives, such as tax holidays and abatements, are generally seen as inefficient, economically costly, and distortionary. Despite this evidence, politicians still choose to use these policies to claim credit for attracting investment. Thus, while fiscal incentives are economically inefficient, they pose an effective pandering strategy for politicians. Using original surveys of voters in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as data on incentive use by politicians in the US, Vietnam and Russia, this book provides compelling evidence for the use of fiscal incentives for political gain and shows how such pandering appears to be associated with growing economic inequality. As national and subnational governments surrender valuable tax revenue to attract businesses in the vain hope of long-term economic growth, they are left with fiscal shortfalls that have been filled through regressive sales taxes, police fines and penalties, and cuts to public education.

A propos du livre

À propos des auteurs

Nathan M. Jensen is Professor of Government at the University of Texas, Austin. His research focusses on government economic development strategies, firm non-market strategies and business-government relations, as well as the politics of oil and natural resources, political risk in emerging markets, trade policy, and international institutions.

Edmund J. Malesky is a Professor of Political Economy and the Associate Chair of the Political Science Department at Duke University, North Carolina. He is a noted specialist in economic development, authoritarian institutions, and comparative political economy in Vietnam and has published extensively in leading political science and economic journals.

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: Cambridge University Press
• Date d'édition: 2019
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 1108408532
• ISBN 13: 9781108408530
• Reliure: Broché
• Nombre de pages: 272
• Coordonnées du fabricant: non disponible
• Personne responsable: Avery; https://www.avery.fr/; ; chemin des peupliers 27; Dardilly; France