Incentives to Pander: How Politicians Use Corporate Welfare for Political Gain - Couverture souple

Livre 12 sur 20: Business and Public Policy

Jensen, Nathan

 
9781108408530: Incentives to Pander: How Politicians Use Corporate Welfare for Political Gain

Synopsis

An examination of why politicians choose to employ targeted tax incentives to firms that are inefficient and distortionary.

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À propos des auteurs

Nathan M. Jensen is Professor of Government at the University of Texas, Austin. His research focusses on government economic development strategies, firm non-market strategies and business-government relations, as well as the politics of oil and natural resources, political risk in emerging markets, trade policy, and international institutions.

Edmund J. Malesky is a Professor of Political Economy and the Associate Chair of the Political Science Department at Duke University, North Carolina. He is a noted specialist in economic development, authoritarian institutions, and comparative political economy in Vietnam and has published extensively in leading political science and economic journals.

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Autres éditions populaires du même titre

9781108418904: Incentives to Pander: How Politicians Use Corporate Welfare for Political Gain

Edition présentée

ISBN 10 :  1108418902 ISBN 13 :  9781108418904
Editeur : Cambridge University Press, 2018
Couverture rigide