This book addresses the long-standing puzzle of how China's private sector manages to grow without secure property rights, and proposes a new theory of selective property rights to explain this phenomenon. Drawing on rich empirical evidence including in-depth interviews, a unique national survey of private entrepreneurs, two original national audit experiments and secondary sources, Professor Yue Hou shows that private entrepreneurs in China actively seek opportunities within formal institutions to advance their business interests. By securing seats in the local legislatures, entrepreneurs use their political capital to deter local officials from demanding bribes, ad hoc taxes, and other types of informal payments. In doing so they create a system of selective, individualized, and predictable property rights. This system of selective property rights is key to understanding the private sector growth in the absence of the rule of law.
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Yue Hou is Assistant Professor in the Political Science department at the University of Pennsylvania. Her research interests include political economy and authoritarian politics, with a regional focus on China. Her work has appeared in the Journal of Politics, the Journal of Experimental Political Science, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, and Social Science Quarterly, and has been featured in the New York Times and the Boston Review. She also writes articles for Chinese media outlets including the Southern Weekly and Tencent ipress.
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Vendeur : Prior Books Ltd, Cheltenham, Royaume-Uni
Hardcover. Etat : Like New. First Edition. A firm and square hardback with sharp corners and strong joints, just showing a few very minor cosmetic rubs. Hence a non-text page has a small 'damaged' stamp. Despite such this book is actually in nearly new condition and appears unread. Thus the contents are crisp, fresh and tight; no pen-marks. Now offered for sale at a very sensible price.Firm, square and tight with sharp corners and sturdy hinges, just showing a few minor rubs and some mild cosmetic wear. Hence a non-text page is stamped 'damaged'. Despite such this book is in nearly new condition. Thus the contents are crisp, fresh and clean. Offered for sale at a very sensible price. N° de réf. du vendeur 119069
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Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. This book addresses the long-standing puzzle of how China's private sector manages to grow without secure property rights, and proposes a new theory of selective property rights to explain this phenomenon. Drawing on rich empirical evidence including in-depth interviews, a unique national survey of private entrepreneurs, two original national audit experiments and secondary sources, Professor Yue Hou shows that private entrepreneurs in China actively seek opportunities within formal institutions to advance their business interests. By securing seats in the local legislatures, entrepreneurs use their political capital to deter local officials from demanding bribes, ad hoc taxes, and other types of informal payments. In doing so they create a system of selective, individualized, and predictable property rights. This system of selective property rights is key to understanding the private sector growth in the absence of the rule of law. This book addresses the long-standing puzzle of how China's private sector manages to grow without secure property rights. Drawing on rich empirical evidence, this book challenges existing theories of property rights and growth, and shows that a selective property rights regime can generate and sustain economic growth and political stability. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781108498159
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Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book addresses the long-standing puzzle of how China s private sector manages to grow without secure property rights. Drawing on rich empirical evidence, this book challenges existing theories of property rights and growth, and shows that a selective p. N° de réf. du vendeur 280990735
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