Optimal Economic Transparency - Couverture souple

Walsh, Carl E

Couverture souple

ISBN 10 : 1249556805 ISBN 13 : 9781249556800

Editeur : Bibliogov, 2012

Synopsis

In this paper, I explore the optimal extent to which the central bank should disseminate information among private agents. Individual firms are assumed to have diverse private information, and the central bank provides public information either implicitly, by setting its policy instrument, or explicitly, by making announcements about its short-run targets. The optimal degree of economic transparency is affected differently by cost and demand shocks. More-accurate central bank forecasts of demand shocks reduce optimal transparency, while more-accurate forecasts of cost shocks increase optimal transparency. Increased persistence in demand (cost) disturbances increases (reduces) optimal transparency.

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: Bibliogov
• Date d'édition: 2012
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 1249556805
• ISBN 13: 9781249556800
• Reliure: Broché
• Nombre de pages: 36
• Coordonnées du fabricant: non disponible
• Personne responsable: non disponible