We examine an interesting puzzle in monetary economics between what monetary authorities claim (namely, to be forward looking and preemptive) and the poor stabilization properties routinely reported for forecast-based rules. Our resolution is that central banks should be viewed as following "Calvo-type" inflation-forecast-based (IFB) interest rate rules that depend on a discounted sum of current and future rates of inflation. Such rules might be regarded as both within the legal frameworks and potentially mimicking central bankers' practice. We find that Calvo-type IFB interest rate rules are, first, less prone to indeterminacy than standard rules with a finite forward horizon. Second, in difference form, the indeterminacy problem disappears altogether. Third, optimized forms have good stabilization properties as they become more forward looking, a property that sharply contrasts that of standard IFB rules. Fourth, they appear data coherent when incorporated into a well-known estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the euro area.
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Vendeur : Majestic Books, Hounslow, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. Print on Demand pp. 38. N° de réf. du vendeur 393585696
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Vendeur : Books Puddle, New York, NY, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. Print on Demand pp. 38. N° de réf. du vendeur 26386014207
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Vendeur : Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Allemagne
Etat : New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 38. N° de réf. du vendeur 18386014197
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Vendeur : moluna, Greven, Allemagne
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 6485948
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