Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge, Vol. 2 of 2 (Classic Reprint) - Couverture souple

Bernard Bosanquet

 
9781330355657: Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge, Vol. 2 of 2 (Classic Reprint)

Synopsis

Explore the logic of knowledge in depth and detail. This volume continues Bernard Bosanquet’s comprehensive treatment of inference, analogy, and scientific induction, offering a clear path through complex ideas about how we reason and learn. Readers will encounter practical analyses of how we move from one content to another and how universal ideas emerge from concrete differences.

The book frames its discussion with a strong focus on the methods of inference, the role of mediation, and the ways formal and material postulates govern reasoning. It combines rigorous argument with accessible examples, guiding readers from foundational questions about judgment to the mechanics of evidence, testing, and generalisation. This edition unfolds a cohesive map of logical reasoning, aimed at students, instructors, and curious readers of philosophy alike.

- Understand how inference mediates between ideas and reality
- See how analogy, induction, and hypothesis shape knowledge
- Learn methods for testing connections, including negative and positive instances
- Explore the relationship between logical form and real-world evidence

Ideal for readers of philosophy, logic, and the history of ideas who want a structured, thoughtful approach to how we know what we know.

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Présentation de l'éditeur

Of Inference CHAPTER I The Nature of Inference i. Inference shares the essence of Judgment, but, at The least qua explicit Inference, has in addition a differentia of oinferits own. The essence of Judgment is the reference of an ideal ence content to Reality; the differentia of Inference affects the mode of this reference, and consists in Mediation. Inference then is the mediate reference of an ideal content to Reality. If I affirm that I spoke to you in the street yesterday simply because I find it in my memory that I did so speak to you, that is, apart from refinements of analysis, simply a judgment. If, as against your denial of the fact, I corroborate my recollection by pointing out that I must have spoken to you, because you afterwards acted upon something that I then told you, then I am reasserting the content of my original judgment, but with an addition and modification that turns it into an Inference. I then refer an ideal content to Reality, not as directly given in memory or in perception, but on the strength of a content, distinguishable from the former content, bearing a certain relation to it, and itself referred directly to reality. By speaking of mediate reference to reality we have mentioned the differentia of Inference, but have not explained it. Direct affirmation appears to explain itself; but mediate affirmation is even at first sight somewhat mysterious. We are at once met with the old question, How are synthetic judgments a priori possible. The qualification a priori adds nothing to the qualification true which is claimed by all judgment as such. Forgotten Books is a publisher of historical writings, such as: Philosophy, Classics, Science, Religion, History, Folklore and Mythology.

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