Vendeur : Forgotten Books, London, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : New. Print on Demand. This book examines the delegation of authority in organizations where key individuals hold specific knowledge and preferential treatment is granted in decision-making based on their influence rather than compensation. The author posits that favoritism is a rational allocation of power in such organizations, providing these influential individuals with an incentive to drive decisions that benefit the organization. The author also considers costs associated with delegating authority and information transmission and analyzes situations where it may be more profitable to give formal authority to less influential individuals as a strategy to prevent abuse of power by those with greater sway. The book offers a nuanced understanding of power dynamics in organizations, arguing that formal authority does not always equate to true decision-making authority and that subtle mechanisms can influence organizational outcomes. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781332245512_0
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Etats-Unis
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur LW-9781332245512
Quantité disponible : 15 disponible(s)
Vendeur : PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Royaume-Uni
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur LW-9781332245512
Quantité disponible : 15 disponible(s)