Affectivity, Suggestibility, Paranoia (Classic Reprint) - Couverture souple

E. Bleuler

 
9781332248483: Affectivity, Suggestibility, Paranoia (Classic Reprint)

Synopsis

Affectivity, Suggestibility, and Paranoia explains how mood and feeling steer thinking and behavior. It shows how emotions can shape perception, attention, and even delusions.

This book presents a unified view of how affective states influence our minds from everyday thought to conditions like paranoia. It compares affectivity with suggestion, explaining their similar actions on mind and body, and examines how these forces can drive both normal and abnormal thinking. Through clinical observations and theoretical arguments, it lays out how emotions can shape our judgments, expectations, and the interpretation of experiences.


  • See how affectivity directs attention and the flow of ideas.

  • Learn how suggestion works in individuals and in groups, aligning actions and beliefs.

  • Explore how paranoia and delusions may relate to emotional processes, without reducing them to mood alone.

  • Understand debates about the origins of paranoid symptoms, including possible functional and biological explanations.



Ideal for readers curious about early psychoanalytic and psychiatric theory, students of psychology and medicine, and anyone interested in how feelings influence thinking and perception.

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Présentation de l'éditeur

Excerpt from Affectivity, Suggestibility, Paranoia

In order to proceed farther it will be necessary to attempt the formulation of a clear conception of what we mean by the term affectivity, a conception with which we can operate and which comprises all that is meant by the terms "feeling," "mood," "affect," and "emotion." As we shall see the word "feeling" has too broad a significance, while the meanings of the other three words are too narrow.

Just as is the case in other fields, philosophical psychology does not help us to clearly circumscribe our conceptions.

The Stoics in describing the feelings as "indefinite cognitions," had in mind something which in most text-books on psychiatry is not included in the conception of feelings; they thought pre-eminently of intellectual processes. To the scholastics the feelings were either a desire for the good -or an aversion to the bad, in other words pleasure and displeasure, to which was added a certain ethical value, and a special emphasis upon the voluntaristic principle which is always contained in the "feelings." If Hegel calls feeling "intelligence on the threshold of its immediateness," and Volkmar "the becoming conscious of the degree of tension of ideation," we can not deny that these are words which mean little more than nothing to the practical psychologist, the psychopathologist; nor are we any better off when we take into account the explanations which are always indispensable for the understanding of such "definitions." Kant expressed himself most clearly and correctly on this subject, but without effect upon his successors however, whose conceptions are not much clearer than those of the earlier philosophers.

In the general part of the text-books on psychiatry we find as a rule fairly clear statements. Here pleasure and displeasure in combination with the affects represent the concept to which we refer. But not infrequently psychiatrists go beyond this concept, the limits of whi...

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