One for You, Three for Me (Classic Reprint): Or the Design of Optimal Production Sharing Rules for a Petroleum Exploration Venture - Couverture souple

Hampson, Philip

9781334087943: One for You, Three for Me (Classic Reprint): Or the Design of Optimal Production Sharing Rules for a Petroleum Exploration Venture

Couverture souple

ISBN 10 : 1334087946 ISBN 13 : 9781334087943

Editeur : Forgotten Books, 2018

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This book examines the design and analysis of production sharing rules in the context of petroleum exploration ventures. Drawing from economics and finance principles, the author presents an in-depth analysis of a real-world oil and gas exploration agreement. The book employs a Principal-Agent model to evaluate the incentives embedded in the actual contract and proposes an optimal sharing rule that maximizes the net financial return to the resource owner. The author highlights the potential benefits of using agency models not just for general insights but for fine-tuning the design and parameters of financial contracts in specific cases. Through a detailed case study, the book demonstrates the practical application of agency theory in optimizing resource extraction agreements, offering valuable insights for practitioners and scholars in the fields of finance, natural resource management, and contract design.

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�diteur: Forgotten Books
Date d'�dition: 2018
Langue: anglais
ISBN 10: 1334087946
ISBN 13: 9781334087943
Reliure: Broch�
Nombre de pages: 42
Coordonn�es du fabricant: Copytech (UK) Ltd, Trading as Printondemand-worldwide.com
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One for You, Three for Me (Classic Reprint)

Philip Hampson, John Parsons

Edit� par Forgotten Books, 2018

ISBN 10 : 1334087946 ISBN 13 : 9781334087943

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Vendeur : Forgotten Books, London, Royaume-Uni

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Paperback. Etat : New. Print on Demand. This book examines the design and analysis of production sharing rules in the context of petroleum exploration ventures. Drawing from economics and finance principles, the author presents an in-depth analysis of a real-world oil and gas exploration agreement. The book employs a Principal-Agent model to evaluate the incentives embedded in the actual contract and proposes an optimal sharing rule that maximizes the net financial return to the resource owner. The author highlights the potential benefits of using agency models not just for general insights but for fine-tuning the design and parameters of financial contracts in specific cases. Through a detailed case study, the book demonstrates the practical application of agency theory in optimizing resource extraction agreements, offering valuable insights for practitioners and scholars in the fields of finance, natural resource management, and contract design. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item. N� de r�f. du vendeur 9781334087943_0

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