Excerpt from Signalling, Information Dissemination, and Timing of Information Acquisition
The result in this paper reveals that the equilibrium information exchange is determined by the tradeoffs of these three factors: the signalling effect.
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Paperback. Etat : New. No Jacket. Print on Demand. How fast should firms share private information in competitive markets? This book explores a multi-period model where two firms decide when to observe and reveal private signals, and how those choices affect outputs, profits, and prices. It compares cases where a common value is uncertain with cases where each firm holds private value information, using a tractable linear information structure.In clear, step-by-step analysis, the author shows how timing decisions unfold across three stages, how signaling can move the equilibrium, and why full information sharing is often not stable. The discussion breaks down into two main setups-the common value case and the private value case-and examines how first- and second-period effects interact with signaling costs.What you'll experience- A structured look at three timing scenarios for information acquisition and their strategic outcomes- A close look at how signaling, information accuracy, and the value type (common vs private) shape output and profits- A comparative view of one-period versus multi-period information sharing and the resulting equilibria- Concrete propositions that illustrate when early information observation helps or hurts each firmIdeal for readers who study game theory, industrial organization, and economic strategy, and who want to understand how information flows influence competitive timing and profits. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781334344596_0
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Vendeur : PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Etats-Unis
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur LW-9781334344596
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Vendeur : PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Royaume-Uni
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur LW-9781334344596
Quantité disponible : 15 disponible(s)