BLS Working Papers: An Anticipative Feedback Solution for the Infinite-Horizon - Couverture souple

Chen, Baoline

Couverture souple

ISBN 10 : 1491257954 ISBN 13 : 9781491257951

Editeur : CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013

Synopsis

Dynamic Stackelberg (or leader-follower) games are useful tools for studying dynamic economic behavior in equilibrium settings in which some player is dominant. Because of their tractability, infinite- horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg (LQDS) games have received particular attention. LQDS games have been used to study non- competitive behavior in specific markets and to evaluate and design macroeconomic policies. For example, Sargent (1985) contains studies of energy markets based on LQDS games; Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Fischer (1980) studied optimal tax policy using DS games; Canzoneri and Gray (1985), Miller and Salmon (1985), and Turnovsky, Basar, and d’Orey (1988) studied international macroeconomic policy coordination using DS games; section 4 illustrates the present anticipative feedback solution in a LQDS game of a hypothetical industry. The anticipative feedback solution could be applied to the LQ approximation of any dynamic economic setting with a dominant agent.

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform
• Date d'édition: 2013
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 1491257954
• ISBN 13: 9781491257951
• Reliure: Broché
• Nombre de pages: 32
• Coordonnées du fabricant: Manufactured by Amazon on behalf of the author; https://www.amazon.fr/hz/contact-us; ; c/o Amazon Media EU S.à.r.l., 38 Avenue John F. Kennedy; Luxembourg; L-1855; Luxembourg