An extensive literature shows that agency issues and transactions costs influence vertical integration. Another mature literature indicates that market structure influences competitive behavior. However, less consideration has been given to how vertical integration and market structure may interact. The Federal Trade Commission addresses this gap by focusing on the potential for moral hazard caused by intra-firm competition in retail gasoline markets. It is argued that when multiple stations share a common brand in a market, a vertically separated station has an incentive to deviate from the cooperative strategy that the brand-owning refiner would prefer. This book empirically tests this prediction using rich data, and find evidence of such moral hazard. Moreover, it s found that refiners behave in a way consistent with the desire to minimize it: They are more likely to employ vertically separated contracts in markets where the number of affiliated stations is small.
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Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. An extensive literature shows that agency issues and transactions costs influence vertical integration. Another mature literature indicates that market structure influences competitive behavior. However, less consideration has been given to how vertical integration and market structure may interact. The Federal Trade Commission addresses this gap by focusing on the potential for moral hazard caused by intra-firm competition in retail gasoline markets. It is argued that when multiple stations share a common brand in a market, a vertically separated station has an incentive to deviate from the cooperative strategy that the brand-owning refiner would prefer. This book empirically tests this prediction using rich data, and find evidence of such moral hazard. Moreover, it's found that refiners behave in a way consistent with the desire to minimize it: They are more likely to employ vertically separated contracts in markets where the number of affiliated stations is small. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781502491053
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