This new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other's contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Dimitrios Kyritsis is Reader at the University of Essex, UK.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : Chiron Media, Wallingford, Royaume-Uni
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Vendeur : Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : New. This new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other's contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law. N° de réf. du vendeur LU-9781509913794
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Vendeur : PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Etats-Unis
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur L0-9781509913794
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Vendeur : PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Royaume-Uni
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur L0-9781509913794
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Vendeur : Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Irlande
Etat : New. This book suggests that the common conception of law (the legislature creates the law: courts apply it) should be abandoned, offering an alternative framework building on Dworkin's interpretive theory of law. Series: Law and Practical Reason. Num Pages: 182 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: LAB. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 234 x 156 x 10. Weight in Grams: 268. . 1944. 1st Edition. paperback. . . . . N° de réf. du vendeur V9781509913794
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Vendeur : Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, Etats-Unis
Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. This new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkins interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each others contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law. This book suggests that the common conception of law (the legislature creates the law: courts apply it) should be abandoned, offering an alternative framework building on Dworkin's interpretive theory of law. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781509913794
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Vendeur : LIBRERIACB, Pamplona, NA, Espagne
Rústica (Tapa blanda). Etat : Muy Bien. Etat de la jaquette : Sin cubierta. Materia: Derecho constitucional. Características físicas: Ubicación: R3B1-85. LIBRO. N° de réf. du vendeur 76824
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