Why do surprise attacks-whether from terrorists or from conventional enemies-succeed even when some advance warning frequently seems clear in hindsight? Ever since Pearl Harbor the conventional wisdom has been that surprise attacks succeed because intelligence and national security officials lack the imagination or capacity to "connect the dots" from the available information or lack "game-changing" strategic intelligence. But this work argues that the conventional wisdom is wrong: by comparing cases where intelligence failed to anticipate and stop a surprise attack with cases where intelligence did prevent the attack, Dahl find that the key to success is not more imagination. Rather the acquisition of specific, tactical-level intelligence, combined with the presence of decisionmakers who are receptive to the warnings they are given makes the difference. Strategic intelligence is often what decisionmakres say they want, but Dahl finds that in practice, strategic intelligence is generally non-specific and thus doesn't foster a sense of urgency to act. This book offers a theory of preventive action and advances the literatures on intelligence and surprise attack.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Erik J. Dahl is an assistant professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He is also a faculty member of the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) at the Naval Postgraduate School. Previously, he was a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, an instructor of joint military operations at the Naval War College, and served as an intelligence officer in the United States Navy.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : Goodwill Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, Etats-Unis
Etat : good. Paperback Book. N° de réf. du vendeur LACV.1589019989.G
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : WeBuyBooks, Rossendale, LANCS, Royaume-Uni
Etat : Very Good. Most items will be dispatched the same or the next working day. A copy that has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged. N° de réf. du vendeur rev1906052695
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Etats-Unis
Etat : As New. Unread book in perfect condition. N° de réf. du vendeur 19506913
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 19506913-n
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : New. How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to "connect the dots" of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report's findings. N° de réf. du vendeur LU-9781589019980
Quantité disponible : 10 disponible(s)
Vendeur : PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Royaume-Uni
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur CX-9781589019980
Quantité disponible : 15 disponible(s)
Vendeur : PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Etats-Unis
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur CX-9781589019980
Quantité disponible : 15 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, Etats-Unis
Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to "connect the dots" of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report's findings. Examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though warnings in many cases had been available beforehand. This book offers a new understanding of cases such as Pearl Harbor, and provides comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture just before the 9/11 attacks, challenging some of the findings of the 9/11 Commission Report. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781589019980
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Rarewaves USA, OSWEGO, IL, Etats-Unis
Paperback. Etat : New. How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to "connect the dots" of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report's findings. N° de réf. du vendeur LU-9781589019980
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 19506913-n
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles