The Allied strategy for defending Crete was plagued by a series of compromises at the national and theatre level. The disorder caused by the fractured and often changing strategy made it nearly impossible for subordinate commanders to establish priorities of effort and establish a synchronized operational concept. Consequently, the tactical commander, Freyberg, was unable to organize, equip and resource his defense properly.
Alied strategy was unsuccessful for two reasons. First, the development of Allied strategy resembled that of a pinball game rather than a deliberative, objectives-based process. Rather than forcing the Germans into a predictable move, counter-move contest, the indecisive Allied strategy caused them to out-maneuver themselves resulting in available Allied combat power going unemployed. Second, an overall lack of unity of command plagued the implementation of strategies. Polliticians, the General Staff and subordinate commanders who disagreed with the strategy did their best to derail or not support it. Not only were the Allies strategically out-maneuvered due to these factors, but the consequences of these strategic errors were visited on operational and tactical units in dramatic fashion. The operational ommanders tasked to provide forces, equipment, resources and support to the effort considered Greece and eventually Crete economy of force operations and released resources without reducing their own capabilities.
The Allies failed to clearly define, articulate, and implement the strategic objectives of their entry into Greece. As a result, subordinate commanders were unable to create operational level unity of command and to synchronize their efforts to achieve the Allied objectives. Consequently, CreForce and Freyberg were unable to obtain, organize and synchronize the elements of combat power necessary to defend Crete and lost the battle.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : BargainBookStores, Grand Rapids, MI, Etats-Unis
Paperback or Softback. Etat : New. Why the Allies Lost the Battle of Crete: How Allied Indecision, Bureaucracy, and Pretentiousness Lost the Battle. Book. N° de réf. du vendeur BBS-9781608880331
Quantité disponible : 5 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur LU-9781608880331
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, Etats-Unis
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur L0-9781608880331
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Royaume-Uni
PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000. N° de réf. du vendeur L0-9781608880331
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. In. N° de réf. du vendeur ria9781608880331_new
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Chiron Media, Wallingford, Royaume-Uni
PF. Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 6666-IUK-9781608880331
Quantité disponible : 10 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. PRINT ON DEMAND Book; New; Fast Shipping from the UK. No. book. N° de réf. du vendeur ria9781608880331_lsuk
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Revaluation Books, Exeter, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : Brand New. 72 pages. 10.80x8.10x0.20 inches. In Stock. N° de réf. du vendeur x-1608880338
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Royaume-Uni
Paperback / softback. Etat : New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days. N° de réf. du vendeur C9781608880331
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne
Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - The Allied strategy for defending Crete was plagued by a series of compromises at the national and theatre level. The disorder caused by the fractured and often changing strategy made it nearly impossible for subordinate commanders to establish priorities of effort and establish a synchronized operational concept. Consequently, the tactical commander, Freyberg, was unable to organize, equip and resource his defense properly.Alied strategy was unsuccessful for two reasons. First, the development of Allied strategy resembled that of a pinball game rather than a deliberative, objectives-based process. Rather than forcing the Germans into a predictable move, counter-move contest, the indecisive Allied strategy caused them to out-maneuver themselves resulting in available Allied combat power going unemployed. Second, an overall lack of unity of command plagued the implementation of strategies. Polliticians, the General Staff and subordinate commanders who disagreed with the strategy did their best to derail or not support it. Not only were the Allies strategically out-maneuvered due to these factors, but the consequences of these strategic errors were visited on operational and tactical units in dramatic fashion. The operational ommanders tasked to provide forces, equipment, resources and support to the effort considered Greece and eventually Crete economy of force operations and released resources without reducing their own capabilities.The Allies failed to clearly define, articulate, and implement the strategic objectives of their entry into Greece. As a result, subordinate commanders were unable to create operational level unity of command and to synchronize their efforts to achieve the Allied objectives. Consequently, CreForce and Freyberg were unable to obtain, organize and synchronize the elements of combat power necessary to defend Crete and lost the battle. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781608880331
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)