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Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Steven T. Wills is an expert in U.S. Navy strategy and policy at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) in Arlington, VA. He served for twenty years as a U.S. Navy surface warfare officer. He also holds a PhD and MA in history from Ohio University, an MA from the United States Naval War College, and a BA in history from Miami University, Oxford, OH.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : Weird Books, Napa, CA, Etats-Unis
hardcover. Etat : Very Good. Very Good text and cover, minor reading wear to text and covers/edges. US orders shipped via US Mail. International orders shipped via DHL. Additional postage may be required on oversize books and sets. NO prison orders. N° de réf. du vendeur 2508180010
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Vendeur : Emerald Green Media, Simi Valley, CA, Etats-Unis
hardcover. Etat : Very Good. Clean Copy, May have light wear on cover/edges, otherwise very good! Established Seller, We Ship Daily! N° de réf. du vendeur mon0000041430
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Revaluation Books, Exeter, Royaume-Uni
Hardcover. Etat : Brand New. 292 pages. 9.00x6.00x1.00 inches. In Stock. N° de réf. du vendeur 1682476332
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Rarewaves USA, OSWEGO, IL, Etats-Unis
Hardback. Etat : New. As U.S. strategy shifts (once again) to focus on great power competition, Strategy Shelved provides a valuable, analytic look back to the Cold War era by examining the rise and eventual fall of the U.S. Navy's naval strategy system from the post-World War II era to 1994. Steven T. Wills draws some important conclusions that have relevance to the ongoing strategic debates of today. His analysis focuses on the 1970s and 1980s as a period when U.S. Navy strategic thought was rebuilt after a period of stagnation during the Vietnam conflict and its high water mark in the form of the 1980s' maritime strategy and its attendant six hundred -ship navy force structure. He traces the collapse of this earlier system by identifying several contributing factors: the provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, the aftermath of the First Gulf War of 1991, the early 1990s revolution in military affairs, and the changes to the Chief of Naval Operations staff in 1992 following the end of the Cold War. All of these conditions served to undermine the existing naval strategy system. The Goldwater Nichols Act subordinated the Navy to joint control with disastrous effects on the long-serving cohort of uniformed naval strategists. The first Gulf War validated Army and Air Force warfare concepts developed in the Cold War but not those of the Navy's maritime strategy. The Navy executed its own revolution in military affairs during the Cold War through systems like AEGIS but did not get credit for those efforts. Finally, the changes in the Navy (OPNAV) staff in 1992 served to empower the budget arm of OPNAV at the expense of its strategists. These measures laid the groundwork for a thirty-year "strategy of means" where service budgets, a desire to preserve existing force structure, and lack of strategic vision hobbled not only the Navy, but also the Joint Force's ability to create meaningful strategy to counter a rising China and a revanchist Russian threat. Wills concludes his analysis with an assessment of the return of naval strategy documents in 2007 and 2015 and speculates on the potential for success of current Navy strategies including the latest tri-service maritime strategy. His research makes extensive use of primary sources, oral histories, and navy documents to tell the story of how the U.S. Navy created both successful strategies and how a dedicated group of naval officers were intimately involved in their creation. It also explains how the Navy's ability to create strategy, and even the process for training strategy writers, was seriously damaged in the post-Cold War era. N° de réf. du vendeur LU-9781682476338
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : moluna, Greven, Allemagne
Etat : New. As US strategy shifts (once again) to focus on great power competition, Strategy Shelved provides a valuable, analytic look back to the Cold War era by examining the rise and eventual fall of the US Navy s naval strategy system from the post-World War II er. N° de réf. du vendeur 406814440
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Rarewaves USA United, OSWEGO, IL, Etats-Unis
Hardback. Etat : New. As U.S. strategy shifts (once again) to focus on great power competition, Strategy Shelved provides a valuable, analytic look back to the Cold War era by examining the rise and eventual fall of the U.S. Navy's naval strategy system from the post-World War II era to 1994. Steven T. Wills draws some important conclusions that have relevance to the ongoing strategic debates of today. His analysis focuses on the 1970s and 1980s as a period when U.S. Navy strategic thought was rebuilt after a period of stagnation during the Vietnam conflict and its high water mark in the form of the 1980s' maritime strategy and its attendant six hundred -ship navy force structure. He traces the collapse of this earlier system by identifying several contributing factors: the provisions of the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986, the aftermath of the First Gulf War of 1991, the early 1990s revolution in military affairs, and the changes to the Chief of Naval Operations staff in 1992 following the end of the Cold War. All of these conditions served to undermine the existing naval strategy system. The Goldwater Nichols Act subordinated the Navy to joint control with disastrous effects on the long-serving cohort of uniformed naval strategists. The first Gulf War validated Army and Air Force warfare concepts developed in the Cold War but not those of the Navy's maritime strategy. The Navy executed its own revolution in military affairs during the Cold War through systems like AEGIS but did not get credit for those efforts. Finally, the changes in the Navy (OPNAV) staff in 1992 served to empower the budget arm of OPNAV at the expense of its strategists. These measures laid the groundwork for a thirty-year "strategy of means" where service budgets, a desire to preserve existing force structure, and lack of strategic vision hobbled not only the Navy, but also the Joint Force's ability to create meaningful strategy to counter a rising China and a revanchist Russian threat. Wills concludes his analysis with an assessment of the return of naval strategy documents in 2007 and 2015 and speculates on the potential for success of current Navy strategies including the latest tri-service maritime strategy. His research makes extensive use of primary sources, oral histories, and navy documents to tell the story of how the U.S. Navy created both successful strategies and how a dedicated group of naval officers were intimately involved in their creation. It also explains how the Navy's ability to create strategy, and even the process for training strategy writers, was seriously damaged in the post-Cold War era. N° de réf. du vendeur LU-9781682476338
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne
Buch. Etat : Neu. Neuware - 'Strategy Shelved examines the rise and eventual fall of the U.S. Navy's Cold War era naval strategy system from the immediate post-World War II era to 1994. It focuses on the 1970s and 1980s as a period when U.S. naval strategic thought and creation was rebuilt after a period of stagnation during the Vietnam conflict and its high watermark in the form of the 1980s Maritime Strategy and its attendant 600 ship navy force structure'. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781682476338
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)