Macv: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968-1973 (United States Army in Vietnam series) - Couverture rigide

Cosmas, Graham A; Center Of Military History, Us Army

 
9781782661009: Macv: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968-1973 (United States Army in Vietnam series)

Synopsis

With FULL COLOR maps and illustrations. CMH 91-7-1. United States Army in Vietnam. 2nd of two volumes that examine the Vietnam conflict from the perspective of the theater commander and his headquarters. Traces the story of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), from the Communist Tet offensive of early 1968 through the disestablishment of MACV in March 1973. Deals with theater-level command relationships, strategy, and operations.

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Présentation de l'éditeur

“MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973,” is the second of two volumes that examine the Vietnam conflict from the perspective of the theater commander and his headquarters. It traces the story of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), from the Communist Tet offensive of early 1968 through the disestablishment of MACV in March 1973. It deals with theater-level command relationships, strategy, and operations and supplements detailed studies in the Center of Military History’s United States Army in Vietnam series covering combat operations, the advisory effort, and relations with the media. “MACV: The Joint Command” recounts how the MACV commander and his staff viewed the war at various periods and how and why the commander arrived at his decisions. Central themes are the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces from combat operations, the American effort to prepare South Vietnam’s military establishment to take over defense of the country, and the implementation of the Paris peace agreement of 1973. The volume analyzes MACV’s relationships with Pacific Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the secretary of defense, as well as the evolution of the command’s dealings with its South Vietnamese and third-country allies. Perhaps most important, it traces the commander’s role in developing and executing U.S. national policy in Vietnam, a role that extended beyond military operations to encompass diplomacy and pacification. As an experiment—not entirely successful—in nation building, the story of the Military Assistance Command contains many parallels to more recent Army engagements and so serves as a potential source of important lessons.

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