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Kept in the Dark: The Denial to Bomber Command of Vital ULTRA and other Intelligence Information during World War II - Couverture rigide

Stubbington, John

 
9781848841833: Kept in the Dark: The Denial to Bomber Command of Vital ULTRA and other Intelligence Information during World War II
Couverture rigide
ISBN 10 : 1848841833 ISBN 13 : 9781848841833
Editeur : Pen & Sword Aviation, 2010

Synopsis

This fascinating historical revelation goes to the very heart of British and Allied Intelligence during World War II, specifically in the context of planning, control and implementation of the combined bomber offensive against Germany. There are sound arguments based on official archives that the handling of much air intelligence was faulty and reasons to believe that some departments within Whitehall were influenced by parochial and personal attitudes that interfered with the selection of strategic targets and the planning of the bombing offensives. In some departments within Whitehall and even the Air Ministry, there was a culpable failure to understand and appreciate the operational capabilities and limitations of the RAF and USAAF bomber forces.After the evacuation of the BEF the only means of destroying the Axis production of arms and munitions fell to the RAF and this was their prime objective for the rest of the war. The destruction of arms factories, power stations, air and ship production was the underlining objective, although when special targets, such as the break-outs of the German navy's major warships and U-Boats were deemed vital, the RAF were expected to react immediately. Much of Britain's intelligence was gathered from the German ENIGMA signals and became known as ULTRA with a security classification of MOST SECRET. Apart from the brilliant work at Bletchley Park there were other inputs from partisans throughout occupied Europe, Allied agents and various forms of reconnaissance. It was a new type of warfare that developed and improved as the war progressed but all too often the bomber squadrons were put into unnecessary peril through imprecise and unthinking demands from the highest levels of government.John Stubbington graduated from the RAF Technical College in 1961. His career was in Electronic and Defence Intelligence. He worked with Bomber Command, The Electronic Warfare Support Unit, Support Command Signals HQ and the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment. He retired from the RAF in 1985 and worked for twenty years within the UK Defence Industry. He lives near Alton in Hampshire.

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Présentation de l'éditeur

This fascinating historical revelation goes to the very heart of British and Allied Intelligence during World War II, specifically in the context of planning, control and implementation of the combined bomber offensive against Germany. There are sound arguments based on official archives that the handling of much air intelligence was faulty and reasons to believe that some departments within Whitehall were influenced by parochial and personal attitudes that interfered with the selection of strategic targets and the planning of the bombing offensives. In some departments within Whitehall and even the Air Ministry, there was a culpable failure to understand and appreciate the operational capabilities and limitations of the RAF and USAAF bomber forces.After the evacuation of the BEF the only means of destroying the Axis production of arms and munitions fell to the RAF and this was their prime objective for the rest of the war. The destruction of arms factories, power stations, air and ship production was the underlining objective, although when special targets, such as the break-outs of the German navy's major warships and U-Boats were deemed vital, the RAF were expected to react immediately. Much of Britain's intelligence was gathered from the German ENIGMA signals and became known as ULTRA with a security classification of MOST SECRET. Apart from the brilliant work at Bletchley Park there were other inputs from partisans throughout occupied Europe, Allied agents and various forms of reconnaissance. It was a new type of warfare that developed and improved as the war progressed but all too often the bomber squadrons were put into unnecessary peril through imprecise and unthinking demands from the highest levels of government.John Stubbington graduated from the RAF Technical College in 1961. His career was in Electronic and Defence Intelligence. He worked with Bomber Command, The Electronic Warfare Support Unit, Support Command Signals HQ and the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment. He retired from the RAF in 1985 and worked for twenty years within the UK Defence Industry. He lives near Alton in Hampshire.

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
Pen & Sword Aviation
Date d'édition
2010
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
1848841833
ISBN 13 
9781848841833
Reliure
Relié
Nombre de pages
300
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
non disponible