** Includes a New Postcript 'The Chilcot Report―Early Thoughts on Military Matters'** From 2001 Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 'Victory' in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated. In his book Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Christopher L. Elliott retired from the British Army as a Major General in 2002. This book was written over two years while Elliott was a research fellow at the universities of Oxford and Reading.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : WorldofBooks, Goring-By-Sea, WS, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : Very Good. ** Includes a New Postcript 'The Chilcot ReportEarly Thoughts on Military Matters'** From 2001 Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 'Victory' in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated. In his book Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged. N° de réf. du vendeur GOR006620548
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Better World Books Ltd, Dunfermline, Royaume-Uni
Etat : Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good. N° de réf. du vendeur GRP97213775
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Vendeur : Better World Books Ltd, Dunfermline, Royaume-Uni
Etat : Good. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good. N° de réf. du vendeur 55344031-20
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Vendeur : The Guru Bookshop, Hereford, Royaume-Uni
Hardcover. Etat : Very Good. FIRST EDITION with dust jacket - rare and collectable - will send out 1 st class post within 12 hours of receipt of order. N° de réf. du vendeur mon0000130094
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Vendeur : Charlotte and Father, Stroud, Royaume-Uni
Hardcover. Etat : As New. Etat de la jaquette : As New. 1st Edition. SIGNED BY AUTHOR Hardcover. Condition: Very Good. FIRST EDITION with dust jacket - rare and collectable From 2001 Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 'Victory' in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated. In his book Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. Review Long overdue, 'High Command' is a study of what's wrong at the MoD, and an excellent primer for the Chilcot report. . . . Elliott sets out an agenda for reform as well as a narrative. He does so in terms that Evelyn Waugh could not have bettered. ? The Spectator Britain will lose more wars unless military chiefs stop agreeing to impossible missions after a decade of errors in Iraq and Afghanistan, a new book warns. High Command, based on interviews with many of those at the helm of the military and the Ministry of Defence from the turn of the century, also identifies fundamental flaws inside the ministry that set the conditions for failure. Offering a rare insight into the turmoil within the armed forces during one of the most critical decisions of the two wars -- the deployment of British forces to Helmand in 2006 when they were still fighting in southern Iraq. -- Deborah Haynes, Defence Editor, The Times Enthralling, gripping and brutally honest . . . With a gentle, skilful hand Elliott guides the reader through the complex world of 'High Command' to explain why a valiant and well-trained military force was not afforded the proper conditions to succeed -- neither in resources nor in leadership at a political level. -- General Jack Keane, former Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army. Signed by Author(s). N° de réf. du vendeur B9036
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