Game Theory and the Environment - Couverture rigide

Couverture rigide

ISBN 10 : 1858984157 ISBN 13 : 9781858984155

Editeur : Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1998

Synopsis

Game theory has emerged as a powerful new tool in environmental economics, especially in the study of transboundary pollution problems such as global warming and acid rain. This is the first book specifically concerned with this expanding field and addresses key issues in the application of game theory to environmental economics.

The book features an impressive list of leading authorities who begin by providing a concise introduction and overview of game theory concepts. They then present an examination of methodological issues, and finally apply game theory to a variety of environmental management problems. Included in the analysis are the following issues:

• cooperation versus selfish behaviour and the formation and stability of coalitions
• asymmetric information, commitment and fairness, and irreversibility and uncertainty
• international environmental externalities and international pollution control agreements
• cooperation versus free riding in international affairs
• the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, regulation of nuclear power and control of acid rain
• best choice policy instruments.

This book will be highly relevant for the growing number of undergraduate and postgraduate courses in environmental economics, environmental management and public policy. It will also be of interest both to academics researching in these areas and to practitioners in government and international agencies.

A propos du livre

À propos de l?auteur

Edited by Nick Hanley, University of Glasgow, UK and Henk Folmer, Professor of Research Methodology, Groningen University and Professor of General Economics, Wageningen University, The Netherlands

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
• Date d'édition: 1998
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 1858984157
• ISBN 13: 9781858984155
• Reliure: Relié
• Nombre de pages: 448
• Éditeur: Hanley Nick, Folmer Henk
• Coordonnées du fabricant: non disponible
• Personne responsable: non disponible