The Principal–Agent Problem in Finance - Couverture souple

Shah, Sunit N.

Couverture souple

ISBN 10 : 1934667722 ISBN 13 : 9781934667729

Editeur : CFA Institute Research Foundation, 2014

Synopsis

The relationship between a principal and the agent who acts on the principal’s behalf contains the potential for conflicts of interest. The principal–agent problem arises when this relationship involves both misaligned incentives and information asymmetry. In asset management, factors contributing to the principal–agent problem include managers’ compensation structures and investors’ tendency to focus on short-term performance. In the banking industry, myriad principal–agent relationships and complex instruments provide a fertile breeding ground for incentive conflicts, many of which were highlighted by the recent financial crisis.

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: CFA Institute Research Foundation
• Date d'édition: 2014
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 1934667722
• ISBN 13: 9781934667729
• Reliure: Broché
• Nombre de pages: 58
• Coordonnées du fabricant: Manufactured by Amazon on behalf of the author; https://www.amazon.fr/hz/contact-us; ; c/o Amazon Media EU S.à.r.l., 38 Avenue John F. Kennedy; Luxembourg; L-1855; Luxembourg