This book covers game-theoretic approaches to analyzing policies for environmental regulation in the power sector. The scope includes operational and investment decisions in imperfectly competitive electricity markets as well as transmission planning and policy design. Given this context, this book synthesizes equilibrium and bi-level modeling to address challenging research questions such as: - How are power-plant operations affected by carbon policy, such as cap-and-trade (C&T) systems? - How does market power in electricity generation affect market outcomes and CO2 emissions? - How does a strategic firm with first-mover advantage manipulate both electricity and C&T permit prices? - How does a strategic firm with first-mover advantage invest in new generation capacity under a C&T system? - How does sustainable transmission planning adapt to an imperfectly competitive power sector? - How should arenewable portfolio standard (RPS) target be revised in an imperfectly competitive power sector?
This book includes plenty of illustrative examples to facilitate the concepts' comprehension. It is intended to make equilibrium and bi-level models adapted for policy assessment accessible to graduate students, academic researchers, industry practitioners, and policy analysts.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Yihsu Chen is Professor of Sustainability in Technology Management in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of California Santa Cruz. He is also affiliated with the Environmental Studies Department at the University of California Santa Cruz . Professor Chen's main research focuses on studying the impact of public policies on energy, water resources, and transportation sectors.
Afzal Siddiqui is Professor of Energy Economics in the Department of Statistical Science at University College London and a Professor in the Department of Computer and Systems Sciences at Stockholm University. His research interests are in energy economics, specifically the application of equilibrium methods for making decisions and analyzing policy in the power sector under uncertainty and competition.
Makoto Tanaka is a Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo, Japan. He focuses on the interdisciplinary fields of operations research and economic analysis with special interests in the energy and environmental policy issues. His research interests include analysis of oligopolistic power markets and transmission investment using approaches such as complementarity modeling and bi-level programming.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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Buch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book covers game-theoretic approaches to analyzing policies for environmental regulation in the power sector. The scope includes operational and investment decisions in imperfectly competitive electricity markets as well as transmission planning and policy design. Given this context, this book synthesizes equilibrium and bi-level modeling to address challenging research questions such as:- How are power-plant operations affected by carbon policy, such as cap-and-trade (C&T) systems - How does market power in electricity generation affect market outcomes and CO2 emissions - How does a strategic firm with first-mover advantage manipulate both electricity and C&T permit prices - How does a strategic firm with first-mover advantage invest in new generation capacity under a C&T system - How does sustainable transmission planning adapt to an imperfectly competitive power sector - How should a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) target be revised in an imperfectly competitive power sector This book includes plenty of illustrative examples to facilitate the concepts' comprehension. It is intended to make equilibrium and bi-level models adapted for policy assessment accessible to graduate students, academic researchers, industry practitioners, and policy analysts. 284 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783030448653
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Gebunden. Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Provides game-theoretic approaches to analyzing environmental regulation in the power sectorPresents a suite of models for both medium-term operations and long-term investmentsConsiders the consequences of policy proposals for mitigating greenhouse . N° de réf. du vendeur 448682387
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