Analysing the conditions under which governments are more likely to present an executive law or a government bill, this book addresses a central aspect of the decision-making process of public policies. Drafting legislation is an important action to achieve specific policy goals, and the path chosen for this process is part of governmental strategy. This book presents a new theoretical explanation of how executives wield legislative power, based in a formal model. The model is tested using new data from Portugal. It shows that in political systems where one of the political actors has veto powers which can easily be overridden, the type of parliamentary majority is the main consideration for the government's choice of legislative instrument. More specifically, when a government does not have the majority in parliament it is more likely to propose an executive law, and contrary, when a government has a majority in parliament, it is more likely to propose a government bill.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Patrícia Calca is a Researcher at ISCTE - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, Centro de Investigação e Estudos de Sociologia, Lisbon, Portugal. She is also a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Data and Methods, University of Konstanz, Germany.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, Italie
Etat : new. Questo è un articolo print on demand. N° de réf. du vendeur B7PM2GFTGZ
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 44044729-n
Quantité disponible : 15 disponible(s)
Vendeur : California Books, Miami, FL, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur I-9783030923426
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Royaume-Uni
Hardback. Etat : New. 1st ed. 2022. Analysing the conditions under which governments are more likely to present an executive law or a government bill, this book addresses a central aspect of the decision-making process of public policies. Drafting legislation is an important action to achieve specific policy goals, and the path chosen for this process is part of governmental strategy. This book presents a new theoretical explanation of how executives wield legislative power, based in a formal model. The model is tested using new data from Portugal. It shows that in political systems where one of the political actors has veto powers which can easily be overridden, the type of parliamentary majority is the main consideration for the government's choice of legislative instrument. More specifically, when a government does not have the majority in parliament it is more likely to propose an executive law, and contrary, when a government has a majority in parliament, it is more likely to propose a government bill. N° de réf. du vendeur LU-9783030923426
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Etats-Unis
Etat : As New. Unread book in perfect condition. N° de réf. du vendeur 44044729
Quantité disponible : 15 disponible(s)
Vendeur : BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Allemagne
Buch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Analysing the conditions under which governments are more likely to present an executive law or a government bill, this book addresses a central aspect of the decision-making process of public policies. Drafting legislation is an important action to achieve specific policy goals, and the path chosen for this process is part of governmental strategy. This book presents a new theoretical explanation of how executives wield legislative power, based in a formal model. The model is tested using new data from Portugal. It shows that in political systems where one of the political actors has veto powers which can easily be overridden, the type of parliamentary majority is the main consideration for the government's choice of legislative instrument. More specifically, when a government does not have the majority in parliament it is more likely to propose an executive law, and contrary, when a government has a majority in parliament, it is more likely to propose a government bill. 200 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783030923426
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. In English. N° de réf. du vendeur ria9783030923426_new
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Books Puddle, Woodside, NY, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. 1st ed. 2022 edition NO-PA16APR2015-KAP. N° de réf. du vendeur 26394735405
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Majestic Books, Hounslow, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. Print on Demand. N° de réf. du vendeur 401641714
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne
Buch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Analysing the conditions under which governments are more likely to present an executive law or a government bill, this book addresses a central aspect of the decision-making process of public policies. Drafting legislation is an important action to achieve specific policy goals, and the path chosen for this process is part of governmental strategy. This book presents a new theoretical explanation of how executives wield legislative power, based in a formal model. The model is tested using new data from Portugal. It shows that in political systems where one of the political actors has veto powers which can easily be overridden, the type of parliamentary majority is the main consideration for the government's choice of legislative instrument. More specifically, when a government does not have the majority in parliament it is more likely to propose an executive law, and contrary, when a government has a majority in parliament, it is more likely to propose a government bill. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783030923426
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)