This book systematically studies how game theory can be used to improve security in chemical industrial areas, capturing the intelligent interactions between security managers and potential adversaries. The recent unfortunate terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures show that adversaries are intelligent and strategic. Game theoretic models have been extensively used in some domains to model these strategic adversaries. However, there is a lack of such advanced models to be employed by chemical security managers.
In this book, game theoretic models for protecting chemical plants as well as clusters are proposed. Different equilibrium concepts are explored, with user-friendly explanation of how to reflect them to realistic cases. Based on efficient analysis of the properties of security issues in chemical plants/clusters, models in this book are capable to support resources allocations, cost-effectiveness analysis, cooperation incentives and alike.
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Laobing Zhang was born in 1989 in Leiyang, P.R.China. In 2014, he obtained a MSc in System Simulation at the National University of Defense Technology in Changsha. He joined the Safety and Security Science Group in TUDelft as a PhD researcher, focused on game theory. More specifically, his research on using game theoretical models to improve security in chemical plants (clusters) successfully captures intelligent interactions between security management within chemical plants (the defenders) and potential attackers (the adversaries).
Genserik Reniers was born in 1974 in Brussels. He obtained a MSc in Chemical Engineering at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel in Brussels, and received his PhD in 2006 in Applied Economic Sciences from the University of Antwerp, Belgium. He founded the Antwerp Research Group on Safety and Security in 2006 at the University of Antwerp, coordinating multi- and interdisciplinary safety and security research. From 2013 on, he is a full professor at the University of Antwerp in Belgium as well as at the Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands (at the Safety and Security Science Group), both in a part-time capacity. Furthermore, since 2015 he also acts as the Academic Director of the Leiden-Delft-Erasmus Centre for Safety and Security, which is an inter-university initiative in the Netherlands for enhancing risk research and education.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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Buch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book systematically studies how game theory can be used to improve security in chemical industrial areas, capturing the intelligent interactions between security managers and potential adversaries.The recent unfortunate terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures show that adversaries are intelligent and strategic. Game theoretic models have been extensively used in some domains to model these strategic adversaries. However, there is a lack of such advanced models to be employed by chemical security managers. In this book, game theoretic models for protecting chemical plants as well as clusters are proposed. Different equilibrium concepts are explored, with user-friendly explanation of how to reflect them to realistic cases. Based on efficient analysis of the properties of security issues in chemical plants/clusters, models in this book are capable to support resources allocations, cost-effectiveness analysis, cooperation incentives and alike. 172 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783319926179
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Buch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book systematically studies how game theory can be used to improve security in chemical industrial areas, capturing the intelligent interactions between security managers and potential adversaries.The recent unfortunate terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures show that adversaries are intelligent and strategic. Game theoretic models have been extensively used in some domains to model these strategic adversaries. However, there is a lack of such advanced models to be employed by chemical security managers. In this book, game theoretic models for protecting chemical plants as well as clusters are proposed. Different equilibrium concepts are explored, with user-friendly explanation of how to reflect them to realistic cases. Based on efficient analysis of the properties of security issues in chemical plants/clusters, models in this book are capable to support resources allocations, cost-effectiveness analysis, cooperation incentives and alike. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783319926179
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