Articles liés à Bilateral Bargaining: Theory And Applications

Bilateral Bargaining: Theory And Applications - Couverture souple

Napel, Stefan

 
9783540433354: Bilateral Bargaining: Theory And Applications
Couverture souple
ISBN 10 : 354043335X ISBN 13 : 9783540433354
Editeur : Springer, 2013

Synopsis

This book investigates bargaining between two agents. Its objective is to present, to extend, and to apply the present state of theoretical knowledge. A wide range of questions will be considered: First of all, will two parties reach efficient agreements? Traditional economic theory gives a generally affirma­ tive answer for perfectly rational agents, who can carry out complex calcu­ lations instantaneously and without cost. The book uses innovative methods to analyse the implications of less demanding assumptions. A practical ques­ tion related to bargaining is: How much power does the design of institutions such as the U. N. Security Council give to each of its members? Formally, non­ permanent members' votes are necessary to pass resolutions, but theoretical investigation of pre-voting negotiation attributes all power to the five perma­ nent members. Or one may ask whether a society should rather finance the education in higher mathematics for a talented person than remedial training for a retarded person? Different concepts of justice yield different answers. Which particular concept is implemented in a given society is also a matter of bargaining, and it is of special philosophical interest to investigate which bargain will be struck in an ideal society in which individual talents and resources are not yet known. Very generally, a bilateral bargaining situation is characterized by two agents - individuals, firms, governments, etc.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

À propos de l'auteur

Prof. em. Dr. Manfred J. Holler wurde 1986 als Associate Professor an die Universität Aarhus (Dänemark) und 1991 auf den Lehrstuhl für theoretische Volkswirtschaftslehre an die Universität Hamburg berufen. Ende 2011 wurde er dort in den Ruhestand versetzt. 2008-2013 war er Research Professor des Public Choice Research Centre, Turku, Finnland. Seine Arbeitsschwerpunkte sind Spieltheorie, Industrieökonomik, Law and Economics, Public Choice und Arbeitsmarkttheorie. Er ist Founding Editor des European Journals of Political Economy und des Homo Oeconomicus.
Prof. Dr. Gerhard Illing ist seit April 2001 Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Makroökonomie an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München mit den Schwerpunkten Geldtheorie und Internationale Finanzkrisen. Zuvor war er Professor für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität Bamberg und Professor für Wirtschaftstheorie an der Goethe-UniversitätFrankfurt.
Prof. Dr. Stefan Napel hat seit 2007 den Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomie an der Universität Bayreuth inne. Er war 2002-2007 Juniorprofessor für Wirtschaftstheorie an der Universität Hamburg, 2003-2004 und 2008 Visiting Scholar an der Boston University sowie 2009-2013 Research Professor des Public Choice Research Centre, Turku. Seine Forschungsschwerpunkte sind Spieltheorie, kollektive Entscheidungsverfahren und ausgewählte Fragen der Industrieökonomik. Seine Arbeiten wurden u.a. im Journal of Political Economy, Games and Economic Behavior und International Journal of Game Theory veröffentlicht.

À propos de la quatrième de couverture

This book investigates bargaining between two agents. Its objective is to present, to extend, and to apply the present state of theoretical knowledge. A wide range of questions will be considered: First of all, will two parties reach efficient agreements? Traditional economic theory gives a generally affirma­ tive answer for perfectly rational agents, who can carry out complex calcu­ lations instantaneously and without cost. The book uses innovative methods to analyse the implications of less demanding assumptions. A practical ques­ tion related to bargaining is: How much power does the design of institutions such as the U. N. Security Council give to each of its members? Formally, non­ permanent members' votes are necessary to pass resolutions, but theoretical investigation of pre-voting negotiation attributes all power to the five perma­ nent members. Or one may ask whether a society should rather finance the education in higher mathematics for a talented person than remedial training for a retarded person? Different concepts of justice yield different answers. Which particular concept is implemented in a given society is also a matter of bargaining, and it is of special philosophical interest to investigate which bargain will be struck in an ideal society in which individual talents and resources are not yet known. Very generally, a bilateral bargaining situation is characterized by two agents - individuals, firms, governments, etc.

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
Springer
Date d'édition
2013
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
354043335X
ISBN 13 
9783540433354
Reliure
Broché
Nombre de pages
188
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