Synopsis
What factors determine a firm's financing decision ? Informational economics and contract theory have contributed a great deal to answer this question. This book contains three essays that further contribute to this strand of literature with the focus on theories that view capital structure as a disciplining instrument for a self-interested management. Some of the existing theories abstract from other disciplining devices such as ordinary incentive wages to justify debt as a mean to mitigate a moral hazard problem between managers and owners of a firm. Two of the models presented here turn to the question of whether debt can play a role as an incentive device when other incentive mechanisms are available as well. A third model revisits the signaling literature on capital structure in the light of new empirical evidence. All models are embedded into a corporate governance framework that allows to set the conclusions into a broader perspective.
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À propos de l'auteur
The Author : Christian Pfeil studied economics at University of Saarland, Germany and University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA from 1990 to 1995. After graduation in 1995 he joined the chair of Prof. J. Eichberger (Mathematical Economics) at University of Saarland as a Ph.D. student. Upon finishing his dissertation in 1999 he visited the Department of Economics at University of Melbourne, Australia. During this visit he taught a course in organizational theory and contract theory. In February 2000 Christian Pfeil joined chair of Prof. R. H. Schmidt (International Banking and Finance) in the Department of Finance at J. W. Goethe University, Frankfurt, Germany. Since January 2001 he is Head of Division – Financial and Federal Affairs – at Staatskanzlei of the Saarland, Germany.
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Capital Structure, Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance. Entwicklung und Finanzierung; Bd./Vol. 9.
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Frankfurt am Main: Lang., 2002
ISBN 10 : 3631385749
ISBN 13 : 9783631385746
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -What factors determine a firm's financing decision Informational economics and contract theory have contributed a great deal to answer this question. This book contains three essays that further contribute to this strand of literature with the focus on theories that view capital structure as a disciplining instrument for a self-interested management. Some of the existing theories abstract from other disciplining devices such as ordinary incentive wages to justify debt as a mean to mitigate a moral hazard problem between managers and owners of a firm. Two of the models presented here turn to the question of whether debt can play a role as an incentive device when other incentive mechanisms are available as well. A third model revisits the signaling literature on capital structure in the light of new empirical evidence. All models are embedded into a corporate governance framework that allows to set the conclusions into a broader perspective. 204 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783631385746
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Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. What factors determine a firm s financing decision? Informational economics and contract theory have contributed a great deal to answer this question. This book contains three essays that further contribute to this strand of literature with the focus on the. N° de réf. du vendeur 129552081
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Capital Structure, Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance
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Peter Lang, Peter Lang Apr 2002, 2002
ISBN 10 : 3631385749
ISBN 13 : 9783631385746
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -What factors determine a firm's financing decision Informational economics and contract theory have contributed a great deal to answer this question. This book contains three essays that further contribute to this strand of literature with the focus on theories that view capital structure as a disciplining instrument for a self-interested management. Some of the existing theories abstract from other disciplining devices such as ordinary incentive wages to justify debt as a mean to mitigate a moral hazard problem between managers and owners of a firm. Two of the models presented here turn to the question of whether debt can play a role as an incentive device when other incentive mechanisms are available as well. A third model revisits the signaling literature on capital structure in the light of new empirical evidence. All models are embedded into a corporate governance framework that allows to set the conclusions into a broader perspective.Lang, Peter GmbH, Gontardstraße 11, 10178 Berlin 204 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783631385746
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Capital Structure, Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance
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ISBN 13 : 9783631385746
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - What factors determine a firm's financing decision Informational economics and contract theory have contributed a great deal to answer this question. This book contains three essays that further contribute to this strand of literature with the focus on theories that view capital structure as a disciplining instrument for a self-interested management. Some of the existing theories abstract from other disciplining devices such as ordinary incentive wages to justify debt as a mean to mitigate a moral hazard problem between managers and owners of a firm. Two of the models presented here turn to the question of whether debt can play a role as an incentive device when other incentive mechanisms are available as well. A third model revisits the signaling literature on capital structure in the light of new empirical evidence. All models are embedded into a corporate governance framework that allows to set the conclusions into a broader perspective. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783631385746
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Capital Structure, Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance | Christian Pfeil | Taschenbuch | Entwicklung und Finanzierung | Englisch | 2002 | Peter Lang | EAN 9783631385746 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Lang, Peter GmbH, Gontardstr. 11, 10178 Berlin, r[dot]boehm-korff[at]peterlang[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu. N° de réf. du vendeur 125357573
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Capital Structure, Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance (Entwicklung und Finanzierung)
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