Does repricing of executive stock options, i.e. the practice of lowering the exercise price when options are out-of-the-money unfairly reward managers for poor performance and thereby undermine incentives set by the compensation contract ? In a study that compares the pay package containing repriced option with an otherwise adjusted package it is shown that repricing is not more expensive to shareholders than otherwise adjusting non-option compensation components. However, the package containing repriced options provides significantly stronger incentives. Furthermore, a policy that constrains the board of directors from repricing does not have significant effects on shareholders' returns.
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Does repricing of executive stock options, i.e. the practice of lowering the exercise price when options are out-of-the-money unfairly reward managers for poor performance and thereby undermine incentives set by the compensation contract In a study that compares the pay package containing repriced option with an otherwise adjusted package it is shown that repricing is not more expensive to shareholders than otherwise adjusting non-option compensation components. However, the package containing repriced options provides significantly stronger incentives. Furthermore, a policy that constrains the board of directors from repricing does not have significant effects on shareholders' returns. 219 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783631524015
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Does repricing of executive stock options, i.e. the practice of lowering the exercise price when options are out-of-the-money unfairly reward managers for poor performance and thereby undermine incentives set by the compensation contract In a study that compares the pay package containing repriced option with an otherwise adjusted package it is shown that repricing is not more expensive to shareholders than otherwise adjusting non-option compensation components. However, the package containing repriced options provides significantly stronger incentives. Furthermore, a policy that constrains the board of directors from repricing does not have significant effects on shareholders' returns.; Dissertationsschrift. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783631524015
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Costs and Incentive Effects of Stock Option Repricing | Ulrike Neubauer | Taschenbuch | Englisch | Peter Lang | EAN 9783631524015 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Kolibri 360 GmbH, Ettore-Bugatti-Str. 6-14, 51149 Köln, produktsicherheit[at]kolibri360[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu. N° de réf. du vendeur 125358631
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