Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive issues. The purpose of this book is to provide specific tools which will help to write better contracts in real world environments. Concentrating on moral hazard literature, this book derives a tentative checklist for drafting contracts. As an economic contribution to a field traditionally considered an art rather than a science, this treatment also gives much attention to methodological issues.
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The Author : Alexander Stremitzer, born in 1974. From 1994 to 2000 education in Business Administration, Law and Philosophy in Vienna and Paris. Experience in Consulting and Legislative Lobbying. Ph.D. 2003, currently Assistant Professor at the University of Bonn, Economics Department.
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Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive issues. The purpose of this book is to provide specific tools which will help to write better contracts in real world environments. Concentrating on moral hazard literature, this book derives a tentative checklist for drafting contracts. As an economic contribution to a field traditionally considered an art rather than a science, this treatment also gives much attention to methodological issues. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783631529737
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