Mind Out of Action: The Intentionality of Automatic Actions - Couverture souple

Di Nucci, Ezio

 
9783639069365: Mind Out of Action: The Intentionality of Automatic Actions
Couverture souple
ISBN 10 : 3639069366 ISBN 13 : 9783639069365
Editeur : VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2013

Synopsis

Mind Out of Action challenges a central dogma of contemporary philosophy of action, causalism: the idea that some movement is an action in virtue of the kind of causes it has; namely, psychological states that rationalize it. By looking at automatic actions, Di Nucci argues against both reductive (Davidson) and non-reductive (the Simple View and Bratman) causal accounts of intentional action. Automatic actions are routine performances the agent carries out without having to attend to them, like changing gear or pulling a trigger. The author argues that automatic actions do not fit the causalist bill because there is not always evidence for the attribution of the required content-specific psychological states. After having presented and defined the concept of Automatic Action, and having shown how common such concept is in empirical psychology, Di Nucci goes on to argue against reductive and non-reductive causalism. In the last chapter an alternative to causalism is presented and defended, the Guidance View, inspired by Frankfurt. Mind Out of Action will be of interest to students and scholars of the philosophy of mind and action, as well as to psychologists.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Présentation de l'éditeur

Mind Out of Action challenges a central dogma of contemporary philosophy of action, causalism: the idea that some movement is an action in virtue of the kind of causes it has; namely, psychological states that rationalize it. By looking at automatic actions, Di Nucci argues against both reductive (Davidson) and non-reductive (the Simple View and Bratman) causal accounts of intentional action. Automatic actions are routine performances the agent carries out without having to attend to them, like changing gear or pulling a trigger. The author argues that automatic actions do not fit the causalist bill because there is not always evidence for the attribution of the required content-specific psychological states. After having presented and defined the concept of Automatic Action, and having shown how common such concept is in empirical psychology, Di Nucci goes on to argue against reductive and non-reductive causalism. In the last chapter an alternative to causalism is presented and defended, the Guidance View, inspired by Frankfurt. Mind Out of Action will be of interest to students and scholars of the philosophy of mind and action, as well as to psychologists.

Biographie de l'auteur

Ezio Di Nucci (Laurea, Roma; Msc & PhD, Edinburgh) is Lecturer in Philosophy of Mind & Language at University College Dublin. He works in the philosophy of action. His publications include Content, Consciousness, and Perception (CSP, 2006) and Simply, False (Analysis, 2009). His other research interests are animal ethics and political philosophy.

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
VDM Verlag Dr. Müller
Date d'édition
2013
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
3639069366
ISBN 13 
9783639069365
Reliure
Broché
Nombre de pages
140
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
non disponible