Articles liés à Why They Fight: The Reputational Benefit of War

Why They Fight: The Reputational Benefit of War - Couverture souple

Vogel, Hannes

 
9783639196986: Why They Fight: The Reputational Benefit of War
Couverture souple
ISBN 10 : 3639196988 ISBN 13 : 9783639196986
Editeur : VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2010

Synopsis

Why do people fight although the human and material cost of fighting blatantly defies common sense? This book uses Game Theory and reputation to explain why civil wars drag on for ten years on average. Unlike theories classifying belligerents by their ideological motivation (limited, greedy, total spoilers) it emphasizes strategic motives: war is immoral yet instrumental. Although irrational in the short run, fighting becomes reasonable when some factions view the immediate cost of war as a profitable long-term investment in their bargaining power. Like hard-nosed poker players, these spoilers fight today to build a reputation for resoluteness, helping them extort higher concessions from their opponents tomorrow. However, pushing the envelope in this power poker obliterates lives on the battlefield not chips at the gambling table. But tomorrow's juice is worth today's squeeze if sequential peace negotiations are linked and peacebuilders cannot tell resolute spoilers from weaklings bluffing to maximize their power. When rattling the sabers yields a future power dividend, spoilers are made not born: reputational deterrence becomes profitable regardless of their true fighting costs.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Présentation de l'éditeur

Why do people fight although the human and material cost of fighting blatantly defies common sense? This book uses Game Theory and reputation to explain why civil wars drag on for ten years on average. Unlike theories classifying belligerents by their ideological motivation (limited, greedy, total spoilers) it emphasizes strategic motives: war is immoral yet instrumental. Although irrational in the short run, fighting becomes reasonable when some factions view the immediate cost of war as a profitable long-term investment in their bargaining power. Like hard-nosed poker players, these spoilers fight today to build a reputation for resoluteness, helping them extort higher concessions from their opponents tomorrow. However, pushing the envelope in this power poker obliterates lives on the battlefield not chips at the gambling table. But tomorrow's juice is worth today's squeeze if sequential peace negotiations are linked and peacebuilders cannot tell resolute spoilers from weaklings bluffing to maximize their power. When rattling the sabers yields a future power dividend, spoilers are made not born: reputational deterrence becomes profitable regardless of their true fighting costs.

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
VDM Verlag Dr. Müller
Date d'édition
2010
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
3639196988
ISBN 13 
9783639196986
Reliure
Broché
Nombre de pages
124
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
non disponible