Revision with unchanged content. While most philosophers agree that intentional actions play an important role in our ascriptions of responsibility, there is disagreement concerning the precise nature of this role. Unfortunately, there has traditionally been a dearth of empirical data about ascriptions of intentional action. Lately, however, researchers have begun filing in this empirical lacuna. In this book, I discuss how this research sheds light on problems in action theory, ethics, and legal philosophy. In doing so, I first set the stage by discussing some of the problems traditionally associated with the concept of intentional action before turning my attention to recent research on the folk concept of intentional action. Finally, I compare and contrast the folk concepts of intention and intentional action with their legal counterparts. My goal is to flesh out the extent to which these concepts diverge—a problem that is particularly pressing given that in litigated cases involving juries, jurors are often asked to judge whether the defendant acted intentionally, purposely, and knowingly. This book is addressed to philosophers and psychologists working at the intersection of folk psychology and the law.
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Revision with unchanged content. While most philosophers agree that intentional actions play an important role in our ascriptions of responsibility, there is disagreement concerning the precise nature of this role. Unfortunately, there has traditionally been a dearth of empirical data about ascriptions of intentional action. Lately, however, researchers have begun filing in this empirical lacuna. In this book, I discuss how this research sheds light on problems in action theory, ethics, and legal philosophy. In doing so, I first set the stage by discussing some of the problems traditionally associated with the concept of intentional action before turning my attention to recent research on the folk concept of intentional action. Finally, I compare and contrast the folk concepts of intention and intentional action with their legal counterparts. My goal is to flesh out the extent to which these concepts diverge—a problem that is particularly pressing given that in litigated cases involving juries, jurors are often asked to judge whether the defendant acted intentionally, purposely, and knowingly. This book is addressed to philosophers and psychologists working at the intersection of folk psychology and the law.
is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Dickinson College. His research focuses on action theory, moral psychology, and thephilosophy of law. Professor Nadelhoffer is currently working on a book manuscript entitledThe Roots of Retributivism: The Past, Present, and Future of Punishment.
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Revision with unchanged content. While most philosophers agree that intentional actions play an important role in our ascriptions of responsibility, there is disagreement concerning the precise nature of this role. Unfortunately, there has traditionally been a dearth of empirical data about ascriptions of intentional action. Lately, however, researchers have begun filing in this empirical lacuna. In this book, I discuss how this research sheds light on problems in action theory, ethics, and legal philosophy. In doing so, I first set the stage by discussing some of the problems traditionally associated with the concept of intentional action before turning my attention to recent research on the folk concept of intentional action. Finally, I compare and contrast the folk concepts of intention and intentional action with their legal counterparts. My goal is to flesh out the extent to which these concepts diverge a problem that is particularly pressing given that in litigated cases involving juries, jurors are often asked to judge whether the defendant acted intentionally, purposely, and knowingly. This book is addressed to philosophers and psychologists working at the intersection of folk psychology and the law. 188 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783639452587
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Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Autor/Autorin: Nadelhoffer Thomasis an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Dickinson College. His research focuses on action theory, moral psychology, and thephilosophy of law. Professor Nadelhoffer is currently working on a book manuscript entitl. N° de réf. du vendeur 4989452
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Intentions and Intentional Actions in Ordinary Language and the Law | Thomas Nadelhoffer | Taschenbuch | 188 S. | Englisch | 2012 | AV Akademikerverlag | EAN 9783639452587 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: preigu GmbH & Co. KG, Lengericher Landstr. 19, 49078 Osnabrück, mail[at]preigu[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu. N° de réf. du vendeur 106324623
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Revision with unchanged content. While most philosophers agree that intentional actions play an important role in our ascriptions of responsibility, there is disagreement concerning the precise nature of this role. Unfortunately, there has traditionally been a dearth of empirical data about ascriptions of intentional action. Lately, however, researchers have begun filing in this empirical lacuna. In this book, I discuss how this research sheds light on problems in action theory, ethics, and legal philosophy. In doing so, I first set the stage by discussing some of the problems traditionally associated with the concept of intentional action before turning my attention to recent research on the folk concept of intentional action. Finally, I compare and contrast the folk concepts of intention and intentional action with their legal counterparts. My goal is to flesh out the extent to which these concepts diverge-a problem that is particularly pressing given that in litigated cases involving juries, jurors are often asked to judge whether the defendant acted intentionally, purposely, and knowingly. This book is addressed to philosophers and psychologists working at the intersection of folk psychology and the law.VDM Verlag, Dudweiler Landstraße 99, 66123 Saarbrücken 188 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783639452587
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