Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. The book studies this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Milan Horniaček is currently an Associate Professor of Economics at the Institute of Public Policy and Economics of the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences of the Comenius University in Bratislava. His research interests include non-cooperative game theory, industrial organization, antitrust policy and microeconomic theory. The analysis of equilibria in infinite horizon non-cooperative games that are immune to deviations by coalitions is the most important part of his research.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, Italie
Etat : new. Questo è un articolo print on demand. N° de réf. du vendeur a724b35c78b4d5e5bb98e36f29db4998
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 12535645-n
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Basi6 International, Irving, TX, Etats-Unis
Etat : Brand New. New. Delivery takes 25-30 days. Excellent Customer Service. N° de réf. du vendeur POD-113358
Quantité disponible : 10 disponible(s)
Vendeur : California Books, Miami, FL, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur I-9783642197628
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Etats-Unis
Etat : As New. Unread book in perfect condition. N° de réf. du vendeur 12535645
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Allemagne
Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms' average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good is produced with the lowest possible costs. If, in addition, all buyers are retailers (i.e., they resell the goods purchased in the analyzed market in a retail market) then the equilibrium vector of the quantities sold in the retail market is sold with the lowest possible selling costs. We specify sufficient conditions under which collusion increases consumer welfare. 100 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783642197628
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Books Puddle, New York, NY, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. pp. 102. N° de réf. du vendeur 263563108
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 12535645-n
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Majestic Books, Hounslow, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. Print on Demand pp. 102 Illus. N° de réf. du vendeur 4317627
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Royaume-Uni
Etat : As New. Unread book in perfect condition. N° de réf. du vendeur 12535645
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles