"It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical." This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo- gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni- tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism, social learning theory, consistency theories, and expectancy- value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that "thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any- thing," that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in- volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions, and the enactment of the be- havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main- tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : HPB-Ruby, Dallas, TX, Etats-Unis
paperback. Etat : Very Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used books may not include companion materials, and may have some shelf wear or limited writing. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority! N° de réf. du vendeur S_462150193
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, Italie
Etat : new. Questo è un articolo print on demand. N° de réf. du vendeur 45GMV3J3H3
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. In. N° de réf. du vendeur ria9783642697487_new
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Allemagne
Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -'It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical.' This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that 'thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing,' that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies. 304 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783642697487
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : moluna, Greven, Allemagne
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 5068367
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Books Puddle, New York, NY, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. pp. 304. N° de réf. du vendeur 2648032579
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Majestic Books, Hounslow, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. Print on Demand pp. 304 19 Figures, 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam. N° de réf. du vendeur 44782748
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Allemagne
Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -'It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical.' This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that 'thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing,' that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 304 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783642697487
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne
Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - 'It is not thought as such that can move anything, but thought which is for the sake of something and is practical.' This discerning insight, which dates back more than 2000years to Aristotle, seems to have been ignored by most psycholo gists. For more than 40years theories of human action have assumed that cogni tion and action are merely two sides of the same coin. Approaches as different as S-O-R behaviorism,social learning theory, consistency theories,and expectancy value theories of motivation and decision making have one thing in common: they all assume that 'thought (or any other type of cognition) can move any thing,' that there is a direct path from cognition to behavior. In recent years, we have become more and more aware of the complexities in volved in the relationship between cognition and behavior. People do not always do what they intend to do. Aside from several nonpsychological factors capable of reducing cognition-behavior consistency, there seems to be a set of complex psychological mechanisms which intervene between action-related cognitions, such as beliefs, expectancies, values, and intentions,and the enactment of the be havior suggested by those cognitions. In our recent research we have focused on volitional mechanismus which presumably enhance cognition-behavior consistency by supporting the main tenance of activated intentions and prevent them from being pushed aside by competing action tendencies. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783642697487
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Allemagne
Etat : New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 304. N° de réf. du vendeur 1848032585
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)