Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Potential wars could be stylized into a winner-takes-all(-that-is-left) contest. The contest design formalizes strategic behavior of, for simplicity, two players such as nations or states. These players set out to make two decisions: First, they decide the degree of arming and then, observe the armaments. Second, they decide on whether or not to use force. Two different mutual deterrence-concepts lead to armed, peaceful equilibria with certainty. Yet another better established concept considers arming to serve a different purpose, namely, to reinforce bargaining power.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Sharon Pfister obtained a master's degree in economics and a teaching diploma at the University of St. Gallen, where she continues to work as a lecturer after finishing her Ph.D. in this topic. Motivated by a strong interest in understanding social interactions and society, her work reflects her curiosity in exploring conflicting interests; as well as her passion for making possible explanations accessible to a broad audience.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 21058210-n
Quantité disponible : 15 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, Etats-Unis
Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Potential wars could be stylized into a winner-takes-all (-that-is-left) contest. The contest design formalizes strategic behavior of, for simplicity, two players such as nations or states. These players set out to make two decisions: First, they decide the degree of arming and then, observe the armaments. Second, they decide on whether or not to use force. Two different mutual deterrence-concepts lead to armed, peaceful equilibria with certainty. Yet another better established concept considers arming to serve a different purpose, namely, to reinforce bargaining power. Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783658039523
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Revaluation Books, Exeter, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : Brand New. 2013 edition. 159 pages. 8.20x5.80x0.34 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand. N° de réf. du vendeur __3658039523
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. In. N° de réf. du vendeur ria9783658039523_new
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Chiron Media, Wallingford, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 6666-IUK-9783658039523
Quantité disponible : 10 disponible(s)
Vendeur : GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 21058210-n
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Allemagne
Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Peace does not offer such an obvious rationale for arming oneself as does war. In fact, war expresses an intention to attack which fuels preparation for it via arming oneself. Yet, there are reasons to arm for peace especially when war is modeled only as a potential outcome. Potential wars could be stylized into a winner-takes-all (-that-is-left) contest. The contest design formalizes strategic behavior of, for simplicity, two players such as nations or states. These players set out to make two decisions: First, they decide the degree of arming and then, observe the armaments. Second, they decide on whether or not to use force. Two different mutual deterrence-concepts lead to armed, peaceful equilibria with certainty. Yet another better established concept considers arming to serve a different purpose, namely, to reinforce bargaining power. 143 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783658039523
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Books Puddle, New York, NY, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. pp. xvi + 143 2013th edition. N° de réf. du vendeur 26142296916
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Majestic Books, Hounslow, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. Print on Demand pp. xvi + 143 41 Illus. N° de réf. du vendeur 135067787
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Allemagne
Etat : New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. xvi + 143. N° de réf. du vendeur 18142296926
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)