1 Introduction.- I Contract Design and Incentive Provision: Theoretical Studies.- 2 Public versus Private Ownership.- 3 Public-Private Partnerships.- 4 Endogenous Information Structures.- II Contract Design and Incentive Provision: Experimental Evidence.- 5 Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem?.- 6 Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard.- 7 Behavioral Biases and Cognitive Reflection.- References.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer published her work with Kölner Wissenschaftsverlag until 2018.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : Lucky's Textbooks, Dallas, TX, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur ABLIING23Mar3113020250013
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. In. N° de réf. du vendeur ria9783658241322_new
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Chiron Media, Wallingford, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 6666-IUK-9783658241322
Quantité disponible : 10 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Books Puddle, New York, NY, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. pp. 224. N° de réf. du vendeur 26378255752
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Allemagne
Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I. 224 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783658241322
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Majestic Books, Hounslow, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. Print on Demand pp. 224. N° de réf. du vendeur 385615447
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Allemagne
Etat : New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 224. N° de réf. du vendeur 18378255746
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Revaluation Books, Exeter, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : Brand New. 224 pages. 9.44x6.61x0.51 inches. In Stock. N° de réf. du vendeur x-3658241322
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : moluna, Greven, Allemagne
Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Gives an insight into contract design and incentive provisionThree experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problemsThe book is aimed at scholars and students of business economicsEva I. Hoppe-Fischer. N° de réf. du vendeur 252294548
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Allemagne
Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.Springer Gabler in Springer Science + Business Media, Tiergartenstr. 15-17, 69121 Heidelberg 224 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783658241322
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)