Information acquisition and information asymmetry are important issues in decision-making as they may have a vital influence on the decision makers' payoffs in the market or other economic situations. The value of information is the main interest in this book. In the first part of this book, the value of information in single-player decision-making games is studied with the proof of Blackwell's Theorem. In the second part, it is extended to a dynamic game of incomplete information involving two players to investigate the conditions for the value of information being positive to the receiver by comparing his expected utility before and after acquiring the information. A signaling game is selected as an example.
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Information acquisition and information asymmetry are important issues in decision-making as they may have a vital influence on the decision makers' payoffs in the market or other economic situations. The value of information is the main interest in this book. In the first part of this book, the value of information in single-player decision-making games is studied with the proof of Blackwell's Theorem. In the second part, it is extended to a dynamic game of incomplete information involving two players to investigate the conditions for the value of information being positive to the receiver by comparing his expected utility before and after acquiring the information. A signaling game is selected as an example.
I am currently a PhD candidate in Department of Economics, Faculty of Arts and Social Science, National University of Singapore(NUS). I graduated from NUS with Double Honours Degree in Industrial & Systems Engineering and Economics. My research interests are Game Theory and Information Economics.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Information acquisition and information asymmetry are important issues in decision-making as they may have a vital influence on the decision makers' payoffs in the market or other economic situations. The value of information is the main interest in this book. In the first part of this book, the value of information in single-player decision-making games is studied with the proof of Blackwell's Theorem. In the second part, it is extended to a dynamic game of incomplete information involving two players to investigate the conditions for the value of information being positive to the receiver by comparing his expected utility before and after acquiring the information. A signaling game is selected as an example. 52 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783659329005
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Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Autor/Autorin: Wang ZheI am currently a PhD candidate in Department of Economics, Faculty of Arts and Social Science, National University of Singapore(NUS). I graduated from NUS with Double Honours Degree in Industrial & Systems Engineering and Eco. N° de réf. du vendeur 5148914
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Information acquisition and information asymmetry are important issues in decision-making as they may have a vital influence on the decision makers' payoffs in the market or other economic situations. The value of information is the main interest in this book. In the first part of this book, the value of information in single-player decision-making games is studied with the proof of Blackwell's Theorem. In the second part, it is extended to a dynamic game of incomplete information involving two players to investigate the conditions for the value of information being positive to the receiver by comparing his expected utility before and after acquiring the information. A signaling game is selected as an example.VDM Verlag, Dudweiler Landstraße 99, 66123 Saarbrücken 52 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783659329005
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Information acquisition and information asymmetry are important issues in decision-making as they may have a vital influence on the decision makers' payoffs in the market or other economic situations. The value of information is the main interest in this book. In the first part of this book, the value of information in single-player decision-making games is studied with the proof of Blackwell's Theorem. In the second part, it is extended to a dynamic game of incomplete information involving two players to investigate the conditions for the value of information being positive to the receiver by comparing his expected utility before and after acquiring the information. A signaling game is selected as an example. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783659329005
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. The Value Of Information | An analysis in Game Theory | Zhe Wang | Taschenbuch | 52 S. | Englisch | 2013 | LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing | EAN 9783659329005 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: preigu GmbH & Co. KG, Lengericher Landstr. 19, 49078 Osnabrück, mail[at]preigu[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu. N° de réf. du vendeur 106037382
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