Relational Contracts and Reputational Games: The Role of Informal Agreements in Supporting Business Relations - Couverture souple

De Maio, Dario G.

 
9783659416293: Relational Contracts and Reputational Games: The Role of Informal Agreements in Supporting Business Relations
Couverture souple
ISBN 10 : 3659416290 ISBN 13 : 9783659416293
Editeur : LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2013

Synopsis

Relational contracts are defined as the set of unwritten codes of conduct that affects parties behavior during a business. The existence of these ‘contracts’ is motivated by the impossibility of predicting all the contingencies that may occur after a formal agreement is stipulated. As widely recognized in the economic literature, the incompleteness of written contracts can give rise to opportunistic behaviors of a party, that reduce the margins for the conclusion of efficient transactions. The adverse selection, moral hazard and hold-up problems are typical examples of contractual opportunism. This book provides an essay on the important role that informal mechanisms may have in mitigating contractual incompleteness and supporting transactions. The basic literature is followed by a formal model aimed at studying the incentives that reputation can generate on the firm’s decision to invest in the quality of its products. The ultimate scope of the book is to shed some light on business practices and provide discussion materials to the industrial organization scholars community.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Présentation de l'éditeur

Relational contracts are defined as the set of unwritten codes of conduct that affects parties behavior during a business. The existence of these ‘contracts’ is motivated by the impossibility of predicting all the contingencies that may occur after a formal agreement is stipulated. As widely recognized in the economic literature, the incompleteness of written contracts can give rise to opportunistic behaviors of a party, that reduce the margins for the conclusion of efficient transactions. The adverse selection, moral hazard and hold-up problems are typical examples of contractual opportunism. This book provides an essay on the important role that informal mechanisms may have in mitigating contractual incompleteness and supporting transactions. The basic literature is followed by a formal model aimed at studying the incentives that reputation can generate on the firm’s decision to invest in the quality of its products. The ultimate scope of the book is to shed some light on business practices and provide discussion materials to the industrial organization scholars community.

Biographie de l'auteur

Dario G. De Maio currently works as economist at the Department of Regulatory Affairs at Terna S.p.a. and as professional consultant at the Authority for Electricity and Gas in Italy. He is also a Phd Student at IMT Institute for Advanced Studies in Lucca. His research interests focus on the design of a wide variety of markets and industries.

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing
Date d'édition
2013
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
3659416290
ISBN 13 
9783659416293
Reliure
Broché
Nombre de pages
88
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
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