The Economics of Contracting Public Project: Some Challenges of Contracting Public Project - Couverture souple

Tolla, Abebe

 
9783659490279: The Economics of Contracting Public Project: Some Challenges of Contracting Public Project
Couverture souple
ISBN 10 : 365949027X ISBN 13 : 9783659490279
Editeur : LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2013

Synopsis

This book gives insights to answer the problem that faces public organization in delegating their mega projects to their agents in three level of hierarchical model. Taking three players: the politician, the bureaucrat and the contractor, I developed a three level hierarchical adverse selection model. In the model the bureaucrat is an agent to the politician and the contractor in turn is also an agent to the bureaucrat. Each player in the game has their own strategies that enable them to determine their payoffs. Basically the players apply the technique of backward induction either to deal with the project work or not. The same process also helps us to determine the outcome (Nash equilibrium) of the game. In this game players have a complete information of their types but have a blurt information about the other players type. In the principal agent model the prevalent problem is the problem of information asymmetry between the principal and his/her agent. The agent knows his/her type for sure but the principal knows the true types of his/her agent with certain probabilities. This is the adverse selection problem that should be mitigated somehow.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Présentation de l'éditeur

This book gives insights to answer the problem that faces public organization in delegating their mega projects to their agents in three level of hierarchical model. Taking three players: the politician, the bureaucrat and the contractor, I developed a three level hierarchical adverse selection model. In the model the bureaucrat is an agent to the politician and the contractor in turn is also an agent to the bureaucrat. Each player in the game has their own strategies that enable them to determine their payoffs. Basically the players apply the technique of backward induction either to deal with the project work or not. The same process also helps us to determine the outcome (Nash equilibrium) of the game. In this game players have a complete information of their types but have a blurt information about the other players type. In the principal agent model the prevalent problem is the problem of information asymmetry between the principal and his/her agent. The agent knows his/her type for sure but the principal knows the true types of his/her agent with certain probabilities. This is the adverse selection problem that should be mitigated somehow.

Biographie de l'auteur

An Economist and Information system analyst by profession, Abebe Simie, works with business owners and non profit organization. His dual profession helps him to understand problems from different angles and sharpen him to provide the best solution out of the possible solutions to the problem.

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing
Date d'édition
2013
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
365949027X
ISBN 13 
9783659490279
Reliure
Broché
Nombre de pages
52
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
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