In this book, Takashi Sekiyama aims to reveal the mechanism of compromise and change in regimes where countries agree in general but disagree on the details regarding coordination methods. When countries agree on the need to collaborate but are in conflict regarding the specific method, one country must always compromise. This situation is known as the Battle of the Sexes in game theory. It has ever been believed that if an agreement is reached under such regimes, the countries do not have the incentive to withdraw from the agreement. This study, however, shows that this belief is not always true if the countries can revise the outcome of their negotiations later. This study also concludes that the factors of “power,” “institutions” and “consensus” determine which country should compromise when the countries agree in general and disagree on coordination methods.
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Takashi SEKIYAMA is associate professor of Int'l Political Economy at Meiji University in Tokyo. He has held several positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, and obtained doctoral degrees from The Univ. of Tokyo and Peking Univ.. He published a number of books and articles in English, Japanese and Chinese.
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -In this book, Takashi Sekiyama aims to reveal the mechanism of compromise and change in regimes where countries agree in general but disagree on the details regarding coordination methods. When countries agree on the need to collaborate but are in conflict regarding the specific method, one country must always compromise. This situation is known as the Battle of the Sexes in game theory. It has ever been believed that if an agreement is reached under such regimes, the countries do not have the incentive to withdraw from the agreement. This study, however, shows that this belief is not always true if the countries can revise the outcome of their negotiations later. This study also concludes that the factors of power, institutions and consensus determine which country should compromise when the countries agree in general and disagree on coordination methods. 172 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783659536717
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Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Autor/Autorin: Sekiyama TakashiTakashi SEKIYAMA is associate professor of Int l Political Economy at Meiji University in Tokyo. He has held several positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, and obtained doctoral degr. N° de réf. du vendeur 5163176
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - In this book, Takashi Sekiyama aims to reveal the mechanism of compromise and change in regimes where countries agree in general but disagree on the details regarding coordination methods. When countries agree on the need to collaborate but are in conflict regarding the specific method, one country must always compromise. This situation is known as the Battle of the Sexes in game theory. It has ever been believed that if an agreement is reached under such regimes, the countries do not have the incentive to withdraw from the agreement. This study, however, shows that this belief is not always true if the countries can revise the outcome of their negotiations later. This study also concludes that the factors of power, institutions and consensus determine which country should compromise when the countries agree in general and disagree on coordination methods. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783659536717
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -In this book, Takashi Sekiyama aims to reveal the mechanism of compromise and change in regimes where countries agree in general but disagree on the details regarding coordination methods. When countries agree on the need to collaborate but are in conflict regarding the specific method, one country must always compromise. This situation is known as the Battle of the Sexes in game theory. It has ever been believed that if an agreement is reached under such regimes, the countries do not have the incentive to withdraw from the agreement. This study, however, shows that this belief is not always true if the countries can revise the outcome of their negotiations later. This study also concludes that the factors of 'power,' 'institutions' and 'consensus' determine which country should compromise when the countries agree in general and disagree on coordination methods.VDM Verlag, Dudweiler Landstraße 99, 66123 Saarbrücken 172 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783659536717
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Coordination & Compromise | Regimes Where Countries Agree in General but Disagree on Details | Takashi Sekiyama | Taschenbuch | 172 S. | Englisch | 2014 | LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing | EAN 9783659536717 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: preigu GmbH & Co. KG, Lengericher Landstr. 19, 49078 Osnabrück, mail[at]preigu[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu. N° de réf. du vendeur 105149042
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