This volume (1) defines the specific-anticompetitive-intent, lessening-competition, distorting-competition, and exploitative-abuse tests of illegality promulgated by U.S. and/or E.U. antitrust law, (2) compares the efficiency defenses promulgated by U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, (3) compares the conduct-coverage of the various U.S. and E.U. antitrust laws, (4) defines price competition and quality-or-variety-increasing-investment (QV-investment) competition and explains why they should be analyzed separately, (5) defines the components of individualized-pricing and across-the-board-pricing sellers’ price minus marginal cost gaps and analyses each’s determinants, (6) defines the determinants of the intensity of QV-investment competition and explains how they determine that intensity, (7) demonstrates that definitions of both classical and antitrust markets are inevitably arbitrary, not just at their periphery but comprehensively, (8) criticizes the various protocols for market definition recommended/used by scholars, the U.S. antitrust agencies, the European Commission, and U.S. and E.U. courts, (9) explains that a firm’s economic (market) power or dominance depends on its power over both price and QV investment and demonstrates that, even if markets could be defined non-arbitrarily, a firm’s economic power could not be predicted from its market share, (10) articulates a definition of “oligopolistic conduct” that some economists have implicitly used–conduct whose perpetrator-perceived ex ante profitability depended critically on the perpetrator’s belief that its rivals’ responses would be affected by their belief that it could react to their responses, distinguishes two types of such conduct–contrived and natural–by whether it entails anticompetitive threats and/or offers, explains why this distinction is critical under U.S. but not E.U. antitrust law, analyzes the profitability of each kind ofoligopolistic conduct, examines these analyses’ implications for each’s antitrust legality, and criticizes related U.S. and E.U. case-law and doctrine and scholarly positions (e.g., on the evidence that establishes the illegal oligopolistic character of pricing), and (11) executes parallel analyses of predatory conduct--e.g., criticizes various arguments for the inevitable unprofitability of predatory pricing, the various tests that economists/U.S. courts advocate using/use to determine whether pricing is predatory, and two analyses by economists of the conditions under which QV investment and systems rivalry are predatory and examines the conditions under which production-process research, plant-modernization, and long-term full-requirements contracts are predatory.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Richard Markovits, the John B. Connally Chair in Law at the University of Texas, has a Ph.D. in economics (London School of Economics) and an L.L.B. (Yale University). Markovits has taught in the law or economics faculties of six U.S., two U.K., and 5 German universities. From 1981-83, he was Co-Director of the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at Oxford. He has also been a panelist for the U.S. NSF and the U.K. SSRC Economics Affairs Committee, a Guggenheim Fellow, and a Fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin. Markovits has published 58 articles and two books - Matters of Principle (on jurisrprudence and constitutional law) (NYU, 2000) and Truth or Economics (on theoretical and applied welfare economics) (Yale, 2008).
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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Etat : Sehr Gut. Zustandsbeschreibung: Mängelexemplar/defective copy. Volume I Basic Concepts and Economics-Based Legal Analyses of Oligopolistic and Predatory Conduct. Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014. XLV,761 Seiten mit Abb., broschiert (Springer-Verlag 2014). Früher EUR 90,94. Gewicht: 1208 g - Softcover/Taschenbuch - Sprache: Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 617547
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This volume (1) defines the specific-anticompetitive-intent, lessening-competition, distorting-competition, and exploitative-abuse tests of illegality promulgated by U.S. and/or E.U. antitrust law, (2) compares the efficiency defenses promulgated by U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, (3) compares the conduct-coverage of the various U.S. and E.U. antitrust laws, (4) defines price competition and quality-or-variety-increasing-investment (QV-investment) competition and explains why they should be analyzed separately, (5) defines the components of individualized-pricing and across-the-board-pricing sellers' price minus marginal cost gaps and analyses each's determinants, (6) defines the determinants of the intensity of QV-investment competition and explains how they determine that intensity, (7) demonstrates that definitions of both classical and antitrust markets are inevitably arbitrary, not just at their periphery but comprehensively, (8) criticizes the various protocols for market definition recommended/used by scholars, the U.S. antitrust agencies, the European Commission, and U.S. and E.U. courts, (9) explains that a firm's economic (market) power or dominance depends on its power over both price and QV investment and demonstrates that, even if markets could be defined non-arbitrarily, a firm's economic power could not be predicted from its market share, (10) articulates a definition of 'oligopolistic conduct' that some economists have implicitly used-conduct whose perpetrator-perceived ex ante profitability depended critically on the perpetrator's belief that its rivals' responses would be affected by their belief that it could react to their responses, distinguishes two types of such conduct-contrived and natural-by whether it entails anticompetitive threats and/or offers, explains why this distinction is critical under U.S. but not E.U. antitrust law, analyzes the profitability of each kind of oligopolistic conduct, examines these analyses' implications for each's antitrust legality, and criticizes related U.S. and E.U. case-law and doctrine and scholarly positions (e.g., on the evidence that establishes the illegal oligopolistic character of pricing), and (11) executes parallel analyses of predatory conduct--e.g., criticizes various arguments for the inevitable unprofitability of predatory pricing, the various tests that economists/U.S. courts advocate using/use to determine whether pricing is predatory, and two analyses by economists of the conditions under which QV investment and systems rivalry are predatory and examines the conditions under which production-process research, plant-modernization, and long-term full-requirements contracts are predatory. 808 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783662521274
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Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Self-contained, combines sophisticated economic analysis with sophisticated legal analysis,Provides clear operational definitions of all the economic and legal concepts it uses,Relies primarily on verbal explanations, and when it uses mathe. N° de réf. du vendeur 130863492
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Neuware -This volume (1) defines the specific-anticompetitive-intent, lessening-competition, distorting-competition, and exploitative-abuse tests of illegality promulgated by U.S. and/or E.U. antitrust law, (2) compares the efficiency defenses promulgated by U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, (3) compares the conduct-coverage of the various U.S. and E.U. antitrust laws, (4) defines price competition and quality-or-variety-increasing-investment (QV-investment) competition and explains why they should be analyzed separately, (5) defines the components of individualized-pricing and across-the-board-pricing sellers¿ price minus marginal cost gaps and analyses each¿s determinants, (6) defines the determinants of the intensity of QV-investment competition and explains how they determine that intensity, (7) demonstrates that definitions of both classical and antitrust markets are inevitably arbitrary, not just at their periphery but comprehensively, (8) criticizes the various protocols for market definition recommended/used by scholars, the U.S. antitrust agencies, the European Commission, and U.S. and E.U. courts, (9) explains that a firm¿s economic (market) power or dominance depends on its power over both price and QV investment and demonstrates that, even if markets could be defined non-arbitrarily, a firm¿s economic power could not be predicted from its market share, (10) articulates a definition of ¿oligopolistic conduct¿ that some economists have implicitly used¿conduct whose perpetrator-perceived ex ante profitability depended critically on the perpetrator¿s belief that its rivals¿ responses would be affected by their belief that it could react to their responses, distinguishes two types of such conduct¿contrived and natural¿by whether it entails anticompetitive threats and/or offers, explains why this distinction is critical under U.S. but not E.U. antitrust law, analyzes the profitability of each kind ofoligopolistic conduct, examines these analyses¿ implications for each¿s antitrust legality, and criticizes related U.S. and E.U. case-law and doctrine and scholarly positions (e.g., on the evidence that establishes the illegal oligopolistic character of pricing), and (11) executes parallel analyses of predatory conduct--e.g., criticizes various arguments for the inevitable unprofitability of predatory pricing, the various tests that economists/U.S. courts advocate using/use to determine whether pricing is predatory, and two analyses by economists of the conditions under which QV investment and systems rivalry are predatory and examines the conditions under which production-process research, plant-modernization, and long-term full-requirements contracts are predatory.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 808 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783662521274
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This volume (1) defines the specific-anticompetitive-intent, lessening-competition, distorting-competition, and exploitative-abuse tests of illegality promulgated by U.S. and/or E.U. antitrust law, (2) compares the efficiency defenses promulgated by U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, (3) compares the conduct-coverage of the various U.S. and E.U. antitrust laws, (4) defines price competition and quality-or-variety-increasing-investment (QV-investment) competition and explains why they should be analyzed separately, (5) defines the components of individualized-pricing and across-the-board-pricing sellers' price minus marginal cost gaps and analyses each's determinants, (6) defines the determinants of the intensity of QV-investment competition and explains how they determine that intensity, (7) demonstrates that definitions of both classical and antitrust markets are inevitably arbitrary, not just at their periphery but comprehensively, (8) criticizes the various protocols for market definition recommended/used by scholars, the U.S. antitrust agencies, the European Commission, and U.S. and E.U. courts, (9) explains that a firm's economic (market) power or dominance depends on its power over both price and QV investment and demonstrates that, even if markets could be defined non-arbitrarily, a firm's economic power could not be predicted from its market share, (10) articulates a definition of 'oligopolistic conduct' that some economists have implicitly used-conduct whose perpetrator-perceived ex ante profitability depended critically on the perpetrator's belief that its rivals' responses would be affected by their belief that it could react to their responses, distinguishes two types of such conduct-contrived and natural-by whether it entails anticompetitive threats and/or offers, explains why this distinction is critical under U.S. but not E.U. antitrust law, analyzes the profitability of each kind ofoligopolistic conduct, examines these analyses' implications for each's antitrust legality, and criticizes related U.S. and E.U. case-law and doctrine and scholarly positions (e.g., on the evidence that establishes the illegal oligopolistic character of pricing), and (11) executes parallel analyses of predatory conduct--e.g., criticizes various arguments for the inevitable unprofitability of predatory pricing, the various tests that economists/U.S. courts advocate using/use to determine whether pricing is predatory, and two analyses by economists of the conditions under which QV investment and systems rivalry are predatory and examines the conditions under which production-process research, plant-modernization, and long-term full-requirements contracts are predatory. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783662521274
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