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The Cold Austerity of Fiscal Rules: Can they really resist the elections heat? - Couverture souple

Souza, Saulo

 
9783843378154: The Cold Austerity of Fiscal Rules: Can they really resist the elections heat?
Couverture souple
ISBN 10 : 3843378150 ISBN 13 : 9783843378154
Editeur : LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2011

Synopsis

Can fiscal rules really avert incumbent's fiscal opportunism in election years? This work examines fiscal performances accross the Brazilian states in years of gubernatorial elections following the introduction of the Fiscal Responsibility Law. By using both quantitative and qualitative inquiry methods, the author analyzes fiscal data and fiscal management reports from a significant sample of states to disclose many cases of a lack of transparency and manipulations of fiscal data by officeholders as a means to circumvent FRL-imposed budget constraints. In general, these cases of creative accounting enabled politicians in office to simulate full compliance with fiscal rules, on one hand, and increase end-year fiscal deficits that were eventually conveyed to successor administrations, on the other. In the end our hypothesis is confirmed that, despite the rules, elections continue to negatively affect incumbents' fiscal behavior. Our conclusions are aligned with theoretical assumptions that a lack of both fiscal transparency and political independence of auditing institutions can lead to opportunist fiscal manipulations.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Présentation de l'éditeur

Can fiscal rules really avert incumbent's fiscal opportunism in election years? This work examines fiscal performances accross the Brazilian states in years of gubernatorial elections following the introduction of the Fiscal Responsibility Law. By using both quantitative and qualitative inquiry methods, the author analyzes fiscal data and fiscal management reports from a significant sample of states to disclose many cases of a lack of transparency and manipulations of fiscal data by officeholders as a means to circumvent FRL-imposed budget constraints. In general, these cases of creative accounting enabled politicians in office to simulate full compliance with fiscal rules, on one hand, and increase end-year fiscal deficits that were eventually conveyed to successor administrations, on the other. In the end our hypothesis is confirmed that, despite the rules, elections continue to negatively affect incumbents' fiscal behavior. Our conclusions are aligned with theoretical assumptions that a lack of both fiscal transparency and political independence of auditing institutions can lead to opportunist fiscal manipulations.

Biographie de l'auteur

The author received a Ph.D. in political science from the Federal University of Pernambuco, Brazil, and a Ph.D. in land economy from the University of Cambridge, UK. He is currently a senior researcher at the Public Policy Research Center of Federal University of Pernambuco. His research interests include fiscal policy and regional planning.

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing
Date d'édition
2011
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
3843378150
ISBN 13 
9783843378154
Reliure
Broché
Nombre de pages
144
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
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