Articles liés à INTERNATIONAL ANTI-DRUGS POLICIES, COOPERATION AND...

INTERNATIONAL ANTI-DRUGS POLICIES, COOPERATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE: A GAME THEORY'S APPROACH - Couverture souple

Vargas Manrique, Carlos Eduardo

 
9783843380188: INTERNATIONAL ANTI-DRUGS POLICIES, COOPERATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE: A GAME THEORY'S APPROACH
Couverture souple
ISBN 10 : 384338018X ISBN 13 : 9783843380188
Editeur : LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2010

Synopsis

This paper examines the implications of anti-drug policies in two types of countries: drug consumers and producers. Based on empirical information of consumer and producer countries and an examination of policy approaches, the analysis depicts an original game where actors are able to find cooperative equilibrium in their strategies under the logic of interdependence. Assuming one country is willing to influence another's policy, the model concludes symmetric decisions might reduce the size of the illegal market reaching a Cournot - Nash equilibrium. The resultant equilibrium implies that both countries share responsibility in defining anti- drug policies and that it is possible to find an optimal budget share devoted to financing said policies. The paper also explores policy dynamics of countries with power, their ability to influence anti-drug policy agendas, and their effect on curbing illegal drug production and consumption trends.

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Présentation de l'éditeur

This paper examines the implications of anti-drug policies in two types of countries: drug consumers and producers. Based on empirical information of consumer and producer countries and an examination of policy approaches, the analysis depicts an original game where actors are able to find cooperative equilibrium in their strategies under the logic of interdependence. Assuming one country is willing to influence another's policy, the model concludes symmetric decisions might reduce the size of the illegal market reaching a Cournot - Nash equilibrium. The resultant equilibrium implies that both countries share responsibility in defining anti- drug policies and that it is possible to find an optimal budget share devoted to financing said policies. The paper also explores policy dynamics of countries with power, their ability to influence anti-drug policy agendas, and their effect on curbing illegal drug production and consumption trends.

Biographie de l'auteur

Colombian economist. He has worked in public institutions and international organizations as advisor and consultant in public policy topics, anti drug policies, alternative development and rural development policies .

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing
Date d'édition
2010
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
384338018X
ISBN 13 
9783843380188
Reliure
Broché
Nombre de pages
92
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
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