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Self-fulfilling Speculative Attacks and Informational Structure: An Experimental Analysis - Couverture souple

Mekvabishvili, Rati

 
9783846555699: Self-fulfilling Speculative Attacks and Informational Structure: An Experimental Analysis
Couverture souple
ISBN 10 : 384655569X ISBN 13 : 9783846555699
Editeur : LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2011

Synopsis

This paper presents an experiment designed to test the self-fulfilling currency crisis models and to examine the impact of public information in context of a signal. Our experiment extends the experimental investigation of Heinemann et al (2002) and Cornand (2004) and compares precise public and noisy public information treatments. Our analysis of the theoretical and the previous experimental results suggests that noisy public information is unlikely to have destabilising effects. In this case we expect that probability of attacks to be lower and predictability of attacks may be worse with noisy public information than with precise public information. Based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Koszegi and Rabin (2006), we also propose an explanation of the order effect of the certain payoffs found in the previous experiments.

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Présentation de l'éditeur

This paper presents an experiment designed to test the self-fulfilling currency crisis models and to examine the impact of public information in context of a signal. Our experiment extends the experimental investigation of Heinemann et al (2002) and Cornand (2004) and compares precise public and noisy public information treatments. Our analysis of the theoretical and the previous experimental results suggests that noisy public information is unlikely to have destabilising effects. In this case we expect that probability of attacks to be lower and predictability of attacks may be worse with noisy public information than with precise public information. Based on Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Koszegi and Rabin (2006), we also propose an explanation of the order effect of the certain payoffs found in the previous experiments.

Biographie de l'auteur

Mr. Mekvabishvili holds a Master of Science degree in Behavioural Economics from the University of Nottingham. Before continuing his studies in the United Kingdom, he spent one academic year at the University of Copenhagen. Mr. Mekvabishvili also holds Master’s and Bachelor’s degrees in Economics from Charles University in Prague.

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing
Date d'édition
2011
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
384655569X
ISBN 13 
9783846555699
Reliure
Broché
Nombre de pages
60
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
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