Advances in Mathematical Economics - Couverture rigide

Kusuoka, Shigeo; Maruyama, Toru

Couverture rigide

ISBN 10 : 4431702784 ISBN 13 : 9784431702788

Editeur : Springer Verlag, Japan, 2000

Synopsis

The role of asymmetric information in allocation of resources, together with the associated information-revelation process, has long been a central focus of economic research. While the bulk of the literature addresses these is- sues within the framework of principal-agent relationship, which essentially reduces the problem to the sole principal's (the sole Stackelberg leader's) optimization problem subject to the agents' (the Stackelberg followers') re- sponses, there are recent attempts to extend analysis to other economic setups characterized by different relationships among decision-makers. A notable strand of such attempts is the core analysis of incomplete in- formation. Here, there is no Stackelberg-type relationship, and more impor- tantly the players can talk to each other for coordinated choice of strategies. See, e.g., Wilson (1978) for a pioneering work; Yannelis (1991) for formula- tion of feasibility of a strategy as its measurability; Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) for introduction of Bayesian incentive-compatibility to this strand; Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994) for information revelation (that is, endogenous deter- mination of updated information structures); Ichiishi and Radner (1997) and Ichiishi and Sertel (1998) for studies of a specific model of Chandler's firm in multidivisional form for sharper results; and Vohra (1999) for a recent work. It is a common postulate in these works that every player takes part in design of a mechanism and also in execution of the signed contract.

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: Springer Verlag, Japan
• Date d'édition: 2000
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 4431702784
• ISBN 13: 9784431702788
• Reliure: Relié
• Nombre de pages: 169
• Coordonnées du fabricant: non disponible
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